Both contracting parties undertake to refrain from doing anything. Non-aggression treaty between Germany and the USSR. Reasons for signing the pact

Control test on the topic “The Great Patriotic War”

Specify the chronological framework of the Second World War:

2. What is extra in the row?

Conferences of the anti-Hitler coalition:

A) Moscow B) Crimean

B) Genoese D) Potsdam.

3. Name the document:

“Both Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any violence, from any aggressive action and from any attack... The agreement is concluded for a period of ten years... Done in two originals in German and Russian in Moscow”

4. What are we talking about?

One of the types of struggle of the masses for the freedom of their homeland, which is waged on territory occupied by the enemy; The fight involves the local population and units of regular troops operating behind enemy lines. It manifests itself in various forms: armed struggle, sabotage, sabotage, reconnaissance, exposure of enemy actions, propaganda and agitation.

5. Divisions of Soviet border districts in the summer of 1941. number of fighters:

A) 2.7 million B) 3.5 million C) 5 million D) 5.5 million

6. The plan for the defeat of German troops at Stalingrad was called:

A) “Typhoon” B) “Uranus” C) “Citadel” D) “Bagration”

7. The main food supplies during the war were:

A) Siberia, Far East

B) Far East, Transcaucasia, Central Asia

B) Central Asia, Siberia, Ural, Volga region

D) Volga region, Transcaucasia, Central Asia, Siberia, Ural

8. Specify the correct match:

1) D. Shostakovich A) “Vasily Terkin”

2) A.Alexandrov B) Seventh Symphony

3) M. Sholokhov B) “The Motherland is calling!”

4) I. Toidze D) “They fought for their Motherland”

5) A. Tvardovsky D) “Holy War”

9. The sources of the victory of the Soviet people in the war were:

A) the industrial base created in the 1930s.

B) strengthening the people’s struggle against Stalin’s tyranny

C) moral and political unity of Soviet society

D) help from allies

D) severe winter frosts in years

E) professional qualities of the Soviet military command

10. Name the document:

“The enemy is throwing ever new forces at the front and, regardless of the great losses for him, is pushing forward... Part of the troops of the Southern Front, following the alarmists, left Rostov and Novocherkassk without serious resistance and without orders from Moscow, covering their banners with shame... Not a step back! This should be our main call... The Supreme Command of the Red Army orders:

...b) form within the army3 - 5 well-armed barrage detachments (up to 200 people in each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them, in the event of panic and disorderly withdrawal of division units, to shoot panickers and cowards on the spot and thereby help the honest fighters of the divisions fulfill your duty to the Motherland..."

11. Match:

Troops in the Stalingrad area

In the Battle of Kursk

In the battle for Moscow

12. Name the field marshal general who led the group of German troops at Stalingrad:

A) F. Paulus B) E. Manstein C) A. Yodel D) W. Keitel

13. The union of states that arose during the Second World War in the fight against the fascist bloc:

A) Resistance movement B) League of Nations

B) anti-Hitler coalition D) anti-fascist movement

14. Surrender of German troops in Berlin in May 1945. took:

A) A. Vlasov B) A. Vasilevsky C) G. Zhukov D) I. Stalin

15. Supplies for the residents of Leningrad during its siege were carried out by:

A) Lake Onega B) Neva River

B) Baltic Sea D) Lake Ladoga

16. The following does not apply to military leaders of the Second World War:

A) Bagration B) Vasilevsky C) Timoshenko D) Bagramyan

Guided by the desire to strengthen the cause of peace between the USSR and Germany and based on the main provisions of the neutrality treaty concluded between the USSR and Germany in April 1926, we came to the following agreement:

1. Both Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any violence, from any aggressive action and from any attack against each other, either separately or jointly with other powers.

2. In the event that one of the Contracting Parties becomes the object of military action by a third power, the other Contracting Party will not support this power in any form.

3. The Governments of both Contracting Parties will remain in future contact with each other for consultation in order to inform each other about matters affecting their common interests.

4. Neither of the Contracting Parties will participate in any grouping of powers that is directly or indirectly directed against the other party.

5. In the event of disputes or conflicts between the Contracting Parties on issues of one kind or another, both parties will resolve these disputes and conflicts exclusively peacefully through a friendly exchange of views or, if necessary, by creating commissions to resolve the conflict.

6. This agreement is concluded for a period of ten years with the understanding that, unless one of the Contracting Parties denounces it one year before its expiration, the term of the agreement will be considered automatically extended for a further five years.

7. This treaty is subject to ratification as soon as possible. The exchange of instruments of ratification must take place in Berlin. The agreement comes into force immediately after its signing.

Signing of a non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) on August 23, 1939.

On the occasion of the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the undersigned representatives of both Parties discussed in strictly confidential conversations the question of delimiting their spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. These conversations led to agreement as follows:

1. In the event of territorial and political transformations in the areas belonging to the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern border of Lithuania will be the line dividing the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR. In this regard, Lithuania's interest in the Vilna region is recognized by both Parties.

2. In the event of territorial and political changes in areas belonging to the Polish state, the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR will be delimited approximately along the line of the Narev, Vistula and San rivers.

The question of whether it is desirable in the interests of both Parties to maintain the independence of the Polish state and the boundaries of such a state will only be finally decided by the course of future political events.

In any case, both Governments will resolve this issue by friendly agreement.

3. Regarding South-Eastern Europe, the Soviet side indicated its interest in Bessarabia. The German side clearly stated its complete political disinterest in these territories.

4. This protocol is considered by both Parties as strictly secret.

(see also protocol option , taken from another publication)

AGREEMENT OF FRIENDSHIP AND BORDER BETWEEN THE USSR AND GERMANY.

The Government of the USSR and the German Government, after the collapse of the former Polish state, consider it exclusively their task to restore peace and order in this territory and provide the people living there with a peaceful existence consistent with their national characteristics. To this end they agreed as follows:

1. The Government of the USSR and the German Government establish as the boundary between mutual state interests on the territory of the former Polish state a line, which is marked on the attached map and will be described in more detail in the additional protocol.

2. Both Parties recognize the border of mutual state interests established in Article 1 as final, and eliminate any interference of third powers in this decision.

3. The necessary state reorganization in the territory west of the line indicated in the article is carried out by the German Government, in the territory east of this line - by the Government of the USSR.

4. The Government of the USSR and the German Government consider the above restructuring as a reliable foundation for the further development of friendly relations between their peoples.

5. This treaty is subject to ratification. The exchange of instruments of ratification should take place as soon as possible in Berlin. The agreement comes into force from the moment of its signing. Compiled in two originals, in German and Russian.

SECRET ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

The undersigned plenipotentiaries declare the agreement of the Government of Germany and the Government of the USSR as follows:

The secret additional protocol signed on August 23, 1939 should be amended in paragraph 1 to reflect the fact that the territory of the Lithuanian state came into the sphere of influence of the USSR, while, on the other hand, the Lublin Voivodeship and part of the Warsaw Voivodeship came into the sphere of influence Germany (see map attached to the Treaty of Friendship and Borders signed today). As soon as the Government of the USSR takes special measures on Lithuanian territory to protect its interests, the present German-Lithuanian border, with a view to establishing a natural and simple border description, should be corrected so that the Lithuanian territory located southwest of the line marked on attached map, went to Germany.

The undersigned authorized representatives, upon the conclusion of the German-Russian Treaty of Friendship and Borders, declare their agreement as follows:

Both Parties will not allow any Polish agitation on their territories that affects the territory of the other Party. They will suppress all sources of such agitation in their territories and inform each other about measures taken for this purpose.

Quoted from the book: Ponomarev M.V. Smirnova S.Yu. New and recent history of European and American countries. vol. 3. Moscow, 2000 ss. 173-175

Contemporary testimony:

What was happening seemed fair to me, and I sympathized with it. I sympathized while still at Khalkhin Gol and, a week later, still dressed in military uniform, from Khalkhin Gol to the already liberated Western Belarus. I traveled along it on the eve of the elections to the people's assembly, saw with my own eyes the people truly liberated from the dominion they hated, heard conversations, and was present on the first day at the meeting of the people's assembly. I was young and inexperienced, but still, it seems to me that I understood how and why people in the hall clap, and why they stand up, and what kind of faces they have at the same time. For me there was no question: in Western Belarus, where I ended up, the Belarusian population - and there was a huge majority of them - was happy about our arrival, they wanted it. And, of course, the thought, which was not alien to many at that time, could not leave my head: well, if we had not made our statement, had not agreed on a demarcation line with the Germans, we would not have reached it, if all this had not happened, obviously, connected one way or another - which had to be guessed - with a non-aggression pact, then who would enter these cities and villages, who would occupy all of this Western Belarus, who would come sixty kilometers to Minsk, almost to Minsk itself? Germans. No, then there were no questions of this nature for me; in my eyes, Stalin was right to do this. And the fact that practically neither England nor France, having declared war on the Germans, never came to the aid of the Poles, confirmed for me what was written about the futility and insincerity on their part of those military negotiations on a treaty that could keep Germany from war .

Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union

The Government of the USSR and the Government of Germany, guided by the desire to strengthen the cause of peace between the USSR and Germany and based on the main provisions of the neutrality treaty concluded between the USSR and Germany in April 1926, came to the following agreement:

Article I Both Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any violence, from any aggressive action and from any attack against each other, either separately or jointly with other powers.

Article II. If one of the Contracting Parties becomes the object of military action by a third power, the other Contracting Party will not support this power in any form.

Article III. The Governments of both Contracting Parties will remain in future contact with each other for consultation in order to inform each other about matters affecting their common interests.

Article IV. Neither of the Contracting Parties will participate in any grouping of powers that is directly or indirectly directed against the other party.

Article V In the event of disputes or conflicts between the Contracting Parties on issues of one kind or another, both parties will resolve these disputes or conflicts exclusively peacefully through a friendly exchange of views or, if necessary, by creating commissions to resolve the conflict.

Article VI. This treaty is concluded for a period of ten years, so that unless one of the Contracting Parties denounces it one year before the expiration of the term, the validity of the treaty will be considered automatically extended for a further five years.

Article VII. This treaty is subject to ratification as soon as possible. The exchange of instruments of ratification must take place in Berlin. The agreement comes into force immediately after its signing.

Compiled in two originals, in German and Russian, in Moscow on August 23, 1939.

Government of the USSR Germany

V. Molotov I. Ribbentrop

Secret Additional Protocol to the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union

When signing the non-aggression treaty between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the undersigned representatives of both parties discussed in strictly confidential manner the issue of delimiting areas of mutual interests in Eastern Europe. This discussion led to the following result:

2. In the event of a territorial and political reorganization of the regions that are part of the Polish state, the border of the spheres of interest of Germany and the USSR will approximately run along the line of the Nareva, Vistula and Sana rivers.

The question whether the preservation of an independent Polish state is desirable in mutual interests and what the boundaries of this state will be can only be finally clarified during further political developments.

In any case, both governments will resolve this issue by way of friendly mutual agreement.

3. Regarding the southeast of Europe, the Soviet side emphasizes the USSR's interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterest in these areas.

By authority For the Government

Government of the USSR Germany

V. Molotov I. Ribbentrop.

Explanation

“In order to clarify the first paragraph of paragraph 2 of the secret additional protocol of August 23, 1939, it is hereby clarified that this paragraph should be read in the following final wording, namely:

Experts from the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation “established”:

The treaty with Germany and its organic part - the secret additional protocol, from a legal point of view, were in conflict with international conventions and regulations of the League of Nations, with the sovereignty and independence of Poland, and violated the mutual obligations of the USSR and Poland to respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability in all circumstances .

Moreover, they formalized a conspiracy aimed at deciding the fate of the Polish state by dividing it, allowing the fascist command to defeat Poland without hindrance.

I think readers should have questions for the experts of the Prosecutor General’s Office in connection with this conclusion.

Firstly. What “international conventions and institutions of the League of Nations” were the treaty and protocol “in conflict with”? After all, all of his points are hypothetical and their effect was assumed only “in case”. If a territorial and political reorganization of the mentioned states occurs, the agreement will be valid. If it doesn't happen, it doesn't work. But in the treaty there is no mutual obligation to rebuild these states by force or by consent. The USSR and Germany do not agree on this, therefore, they do not violate any “conventions and regulations of the League of Nations”.

Secondly. The Goebbels brigade claims that the protocol violated the treaty between Poland and the USSR. Where is this written down in the protocol? Where are the USSR's obligations to attack Poland, or to help those who attack it? Where is at least the commitment of the USSR to demand from Poland for itself (or Germany) any territory of Poland, as in the Munich Agreement Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy demanded this from Czechoslovakia?

Third. Where is the “conspiracy” to partition Poland? The division of spheres of interest is not a division of countries or an agreement to seize countries; only vile scoundrels can interpret it that way. The protocol was secret, and Hitler and Stalin had absolutely no need to speak allegorically and turn the protocol into a fable.

Signing

The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact is a non-aggression treaty between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, signed on August 23, 1939 by German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov.

Text of the agreement

Both Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any violence, from any aggressive action and from any attack against each other, either separately or jointly with other powers.

In the event that one of the Contracting Parties becomes the object of military action by a third power, the other Contracting Party will not support this power in any form.

The Governments of both Contracting Parties will remain in future contact with each other for consultation in order to inform each other about matters affecting their common interests.

Neither of the Contracting Parties will participate in any grouping of powers that is directly or indirectly directed against the other party.

In the event of disputes or conflicts between the Contracting Parties on issues of one kind or another, both parties will resolve these disputes or conflicts exclusively peacefully through a friendly exchange of views or, if necessary, by creating commissions to resolve the conflict.

This agreement is concluded for a period of ten years with the understanding that, unless one of the Contracting Parties denounces it one year before its expiration, the term of the agreement will be considered automatically extended for a further five years.

This treaty is subject to ratification as soon as possible. The exchange of instruments of ratification must take place in Berlin. The agreement comes into force immediately after its signing.

The agreement had a secret addition, the so-called secret protocol, the existence of which the USSR public learned about only during the years of Perestroika. In it, the USSR and Germany defined the areas of their state interests in Eastern Europe

Text of the secret protocol

1. In the event of a territorial and political reorganization of the regions that are part of the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern border of Lithuania is simultaneously the border of the spheres of interest of Germany and the USSR. At the same time, the interests of Lithuania in relation to the Vilna region are recognized by both parties.
2. In the event of a territorial and political reorganization of the regions that are part of the Polish State, the border of the spheres of interest of Germany and the USSR will approximately run along the line of the Narev, Vistula and Sana rivers.
The question whether the preservation of an independent Polish State is desirable in mutual interests and what the boundaries of this state will be can only be finally clarified in the course of further political development.
In any case, both Governments will resolve this issue by way of friendly mutual agreement.
3. Regarding the southeast of Europe, the Soviet side emphasizes the USSR’s interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterest in these areas.
4. This protocol will be kept strictly confidential by both parties

The essence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was that Germany, confident in the inviolability of its eastern borders, acquired freedom of action against England and France, and the Soviet Union, having increased its territory at the expense of Poland and the Baltic states, received time to rearm its army

History of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

1939, March 15 - Germany occupied the Czech Republic, declaring it its protectorate under the name Moravia and Bohemia
1939, March 18 - Initiative of the Soviet government to convene a conference of representatives of the USSR, Great Britain, France, Poland, Romania and Turkey to discuss measures to prevent further aggression
1939, March 19 - the British government found such a proposal premature
1939, April 17 - The USSR proposed a draft tripartite treaty providing for “to provide all kinds of assistance, including military, to the Eastern European states located between the Baltic and Black Seas and bordering the USSR, in the event of aggression against these states.” the proposal did not find support from England and France
1939, April 29 - France put forward a declaration of intent: to provide military support to each other or solidarity support to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the event of German aggression. The proposal did not find support in the USSR
1939, May 8 - England put forward the idea of an agreement in which the USSR would express its intention to help England and France if they find themselves drawn into a war with Germany, fulfilling their guarantees to Eastern European countries. This proposal was rejected by the USSR because it did not meet the principle of reciprocity.
1939, May 27 - British Prime Minister Chamberlain, fearing a rapprochement between the USSR and Germany, spoke in favor of discussing the pact proposed by the Soviet Union on April 17 to help states that might be attacked by the Nazis

During the negotiations, the parties did not trust each other. Particularly difficult was the issue of military assistance that the Soviet Union had to provide to England and France, because for this Poland would have to let the Red Army pass through its territory, which it did not agree to.
“I must admit that I do not trust Russia at all. I do not believe that she can carry out effective offensive actions even if she wants... Moreover, she is hated and viewed with suspicion by many small states, especially Poland, Romania and Finland" (personal letter from British Prime Minister Chamberlain dated March 28, 1939 of the year).

“There is no doubt that the USSR wants to conclude a military pact and does not want us to turn this pact into an empty piece of paper that has no concrete meaning... The failure of the negotiations is inevitable if Poland does not change its position” (message to Paris from the head of the French military mission, General Dumenk, August 20, 1939)

“The obstacle to concluding such an agreement (with the USSR) was the horror that these very border states experienced of Soviet help in the form of Soviet armies that could pass through their territories to protect them from the Germans and, at the same time, include them in the Soviet-communist system. After all, they were the most vehement opponents of this system. Poland, Romania, Finland and the three Baltic states did not know what they feared more - German aggression or Russian salvation" (W. Churchill "The Second World War")

Diplomatic contacts of the Soviet Union with England and France were interrupted by the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which was negotiated with Germany at the same time

1939, March 10 - Stalin, in a speech at the XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, stated: “...Continue to pursue a policy of peace and strengthening business ties with all countries....Do not allow war provocateurs, who are accustomed to raking in the heat from others, to drag our country into conflicts hands"
Stalin's words were taken by Ribbentrop as a hint at the possibility of improving relations between Germany and the USSR. Subsequently, after the conclusion of the Pact, Molotov called it “the beginning of a turn” in Soviet-German relations
1939, April 17 - Conversation between the USSR Plenipotentiary Representative in Berlin A.F. Merekalov and the State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry E. von Weizsäcker, at which they agreed that “Ideological differences should not become a stumbling block in relation to (the USSR) and Germany”
1939, May 3 - People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the Jew Litvinov was dismissed. Molotov took his place. This step was appreciated in Berlin
1939, May 5 - German newspapers are prohibited from making any attacks on the USSR
1939, May 9 - Rumors appeared in Berlin that Germany “has made or is about to make proposals to Russia aimed at dividing Poland.”
1939, May 20 - Molotov, at a meeting with the German Ambassador Schulenburg, spoke with him in an extremely friendly tone, saying that for the success of economic negotiations “an appropriate political base must be created”
1939, May 31 - Molotov reciprocated England’s curtsey (see May 27), but at the same time made a reservation that the USSR did not abandon “business relations on a practical basis” with Italy and Germany, and avoided attacks on Germany, which was also noticed rated in Berlin
1939, June 28 - At a meeting with German Ambassador Schulenburg, Molotov said that normalization of relations with Germany is desirable and possible
1939, July 24-26 - Soviet and German diplomats informally discussed the way to improve relations between their countries
1939, August 3 - Ribbentrop’s official statement on Germany’s readiness for rapprochement with the Soviet Union with a hint of the division of spheres of influence: “On all problems related to the territory from the Black to the Baltic Sea, we could easily agree...”
1939, August 15 - Moscow officially learned from Schulenburg that Ribbentrop was ready to come for negotiations. In response, Molotov put forward a proposal to conclude a full-fledged pact, instead of the joint declaration proposed by Schulenburg on the non-use of force against each other
1939, August 17 - Schulenburg sent Molotov a response about his readiness to conclude a pact for 25 years. Molotov conditioned the conclusion of the pact on the signing of a trade and credit agreement
1939, August 19 - an economic agreement was signed between the USSR and Germany and the signing of a pact on August 26-27 was agreed upon, but at the personal request of Hitler, who was in a hurry to attack Poland, the matter was accelerated
The non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) was signed on August 23, 1939, ratified by the Supreme Soviet on August 31
1939, August 24 - “The friendship of the peoples of the USSR and Germany, driven into a dead end by the efforts of enemies, must henceforth receive the necessary conditions for its development and flourishing”(editorial article of the Pravda newspaper). From then on, anti-fascist propaganda in the media of the Soviet Union was prohibited, even the film was withdrawn from distribution
"IN. V. Vishnevsky wrote in his personal diary in December 1940: “Hatred of the Prussian barracks, of fascism, of the “new order” is in our blood... We write under conditions of military restrictions, visible and invisible. I would like to talk about the enemy, to raise rage against what is happening in crucified Europe. We must remain silent for now...” Vishnevsky took the manuscript of the first part of “The Fall of Paris” from me and said that he would try to “smuggle” it through. Two months later he came with good news: the first part was allowed, but he would have to go for banknotes. Although we were talking about Paris 1935-1937 and there were no Germans there, the word “fascism” had to be removed. The text described the Paris demonstration; the censor wanted it to be replaced by the cry: “Down with the fascists!” - I put: “Down with the reactionaries!” (I. Ehrenburg “People. Years, Life”)

Results of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact
- September 1, 1939 - Germany attacked Poland. Start
- September 17, 1939 - The Red Army crossed the eastern border of Poland
- September 18, 1939 - a joint parade of troops of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht in Brest.
  The parade was hosted by General Guderian and Brigade Commander Krivoshein
- September 28, 1939 - the Treaty of Friendship and Border between the USSR and Germany was signed
- October 12, 1939 - The USSR demanded that Finland move the border 70 km from Leningrad and cede a military base on Hanko Island. give up the polar territories around Petsamo
- October 25, 1939 - Agreement on the supply of grain, oil and other goods from the USSR to Germany
- October 26, 1939 - The USSR transferred Vilno and the Vilnius region to Lithuania. belonged to Poland
- November 1-2, 1939 - The Supreme Soviet of the USSR approved the accession of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus to the USSR
- November 30, 1939 - March 12, 1940 -

The Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939 marked a sharp turn in Soviet foreign policy from support for “collective security” to cooperation with Germany. The division of “spheres of interest”, which the leaders of the USSR and Germany agreed upon, made it easier for Hitler to seize Poland and ensured the territorial expansion of the USSR in 1939-1940.

After the conclusion of the Munich Treaty between Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France on September 30, 1938, the policy of “collective security” failed, and the USSR found itself isolated. This created the preconditions for a revision of the course pursued by the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany. Such a revision also corresponded to the interests of the German leadership, which was preparing for a military clash with Poland. After the capture of the Czech Republic by Germany on March 15, 1939, Poland received security guarantees from Great Britain and France, and on June 14, Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations on an alliance against Germany began in Moscow. However, they moved slowly and almost reached a dead end. Germany also urgently needed raw materials, which, in the context of the conflict with Great Britain and France, could be bought in the USSR. Under these conditions, Soviet-German contacts began, aimed at improving bilateral relations.

On December 16, 1938, the head of the Eastern European reference department of the political and economic department of the German Foreign Ministry, K. Schnure, informed Soviet representatives that Germany was ready to provide a loan in exchange for expanding Soviet exports of raw materials. This proposal became the starting point for Soviet-German rapprochement - so far unstable and not guaranteed by anything.

The German credit initiative evoked a positive response from the Soviet side. It was agreed that on January 30 a delegation led by Schnurre would go to Moscow.

At the New Year's reception of the heads of diplomatic missions on January 12, 1939, Hitler suddenly approached the Soviet Ambassador A. Merekalov, “asked about living in Berlin, about the family, about the trip to Moscow, emphasized that he knew about my visit to Schulenburg in Moscow, wished success and said goodbye." This has never happened before. But Hitler considered such a demonstration to be the maximum publicity of his intentions, which he could undertake without reciprocal expressions of sympathy from the Soviet side. But they weren’t there. Therefore, when reports about Schnurre’s trip leaked to the world press, Ribbentrop banned the visit and the negotiations broke down.

On April 17, the Secretary of State of the German Foreign Ministry (Ribbentrop's first deputy) E. Weizsäcker was visited by the Soviet Ambassador A. Merekalov. The reason for the visit was quite good: after the capture of Czechoslovakia, there remained an unresolved issue about Soviet military orders that were placed at the Czech Skoda factories. However, the discussion went beyond the scope of this process; it was about the “political climate” in relations between the two states.

On May 5, the adviser of the Soviet embassy, G. Astakhov, came to K. Schnurre (again about the Skoda - the Germans declared their readiness to fulfill the Soviet order), and the conversation turned to changes in the Soviet People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Schnurre reported: “Astakhov touched upon the removal of Litvinov and tried, without asking direct questions, to find out whether this event would lead to a change in our position towards the Soviet Union.”

After replacing M. Litvinov as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs with V. Molotov, “Hitler, for the first time in the six years of his rule, expressed a desire to listen to his experts on Russia.” From their report, Hitler learned that the USSR was now adhering not to the policy of world revolution, but to a more pragmatic state course. After watching a documentary about Soviet military parades, the Fuhrer exclaimed: “I had absolutely no idea that Stalin was such a handsome and strong personality.” German diplomats were given the command to continue exploring the possibilities of rapprochement with the USSR.

Conversations between Schnurre and Astakhov became more frequent. On May 26, the German Ambassador to the USSR F. von Schulenburg received instructions to intensify contacts with Molotov. But the matter had not yet moved forward - the Soviet leadership still had hopes of negotiations with Great Britain and France. However, both political negotiations with Great Britain and France in June-July and military consultations in August were difficult. On July 18, Molotov gave the command to resume consultations with the Germans on concluding an economic agreement. On July 22, the resumption of Soviet-German economic negotiations was announced. At this stage, favor towards German proposals could be used to put pressure on intractable Anglo-French partners.

At the end of July, Schnurre received instructions to meet with Soviet representatives and resume consultations on improving Soviet-German relations. He invited Astakhov to lunch (due to Merekalov’s departure, he became the USSR Charge d’Affaires in Germany) and Deputy Soviet Trade Representative E. Babarin (the representative was also on vacation at that time). In the informal atmosphere of the restaurant, Schnurre outlined the stages of a possible rapprochement between the two countries: the resumption of economic cooperation through the conclusion of credit and trade agreements, then the “normalization and improvement of political relations,” then the conclusion of an agreement between the two countries or a return to the neutrality treaty of 1926. Schnurre formulated the principle which his superiors will then repeat: “in the entire region from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea and the Far East, in my opinion, there are no insoluble foreign policy problems between our countries.”

Molotov telegraphed Astakhov: “Between the USSR and Germany, of course, with improved economic relations, political relations can also improve. In this sense, Schnurre, generally speaking, is right... If now the Germans are sincerely changing the milestones and really want to improve political relations with the USSR, then they are obliged to tell us how they specifically imagine this improvement... The matter here depends entirely on the Germans. We would, of course, welcome any improvement in political relations between the two countries.”

German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop received Astakhov and presented him with an alternative: “If Moscow takes a negative position, we will know what is happening and how to act. If the opposite happens, then from the Baltic to the Black Sea there will be no problems that we together cannot resolve among ourselves.”

On August 11, Stalin, having discussed the current situation at the Politburo, gave the go-ahead to strengthen contacts with Germany. On August 14, Astakhov informed Schnurre that Molotov agreed to discuss improving relations and even the fate of Poland. On August 15, Ambassador Schulenburg received instructions from Ribbentrop to invite the Soviet side to accept a visit from a major German leader in the near future. But Molotov replied that there was no need to rush into Ribbentrop’s visit, “so that everything would not be limited to just conversations held in Moscow, but concrete decisions would be made.” Time was on the USSR's side, as Hitler planned an attack on Poland on August 26th.

To speed things up, Ribbentrop sent Schulenburg to Molotov with a draft pact, simple to the point of primitiveness: “The German state and the USSR undertake under no circumstances to resort to war and to refrain from any violence against each other.” The second point provided for the immediate entry into force of the pact and its long life - 25 years. The USSR and Germany were not supposed to fight until 1964. In a special protocol, Ribbentrop proposed to carry out “coordination of spheres of interests in the Baltic, problems of the Baltic states,” etc. At the first meeting with the German ambassador on August 19, Molotov replied that if economic agreements were signed today, then Ribbentrop could arrive in a week - on August 26 or 27. It was too late for the Germans - just these days they planned to attack Poland. In addition, Molotov was surprised by the amateurishly drawn up draft of the pact. He suggested that the Germans take as a basis one of the already concluded pacts and draw up a draft as expected, with several articles adopted in diplomatic terms. To Schulenburg’s proposal to move up the dates of Ribbetrop’s visit, “Molotov objected that even the first stage - the completion of economic negotiations - had not yet been completed.”

But on August 19, a fundamental decision was made to receive Ribbentrop in Moscow in the near future. At the second meeting with Molotov that day, Schulenburg received a draft non-aggression pact, drawn up according to all the rules of diplomatic science.

On the night of August 20, a trade and credit agreement was signed. The USSR received 200 million marks, with which it could buy German equipment and pay off debts with supplies of raw materials and food.

On 20 August, Hitler, risking his prestige, sent a personal message to Stalin to encourage his new partner to accept Ribbentrop on 22 or 23 August. In his letter, Hitler accepted the Soviet draft pact.

On 21 August, Stalin thanked Hitler for the letter, expressed hope that the pact would be "a turning point in the improvement of political relations between our countries" and agreed to Ribbentrop's arrival on 23 August.

When Hitler learned that Ribbentrop could go to Moscow on August 23, he exclaimed: “This is one hundred percent victory! And although I never do this, now I will drink a bottle of champagne!”

On August 23, arriving in Moscow, Ribbentrop received a cool reception, but at a very high level. Stalin personally participated in the negotiations. The Soviet side rejected the preamble proposed by the Germans about friendship between the two peoples, but agreed to the wording about a “friendly” exchange of views to resolve Soviet-German differences.

Attached to the agreement was a secret protocol providing for the division of “spheres of influence” in Eastern Europe. Ribbentrop suggested that the USSR control the fate of Finland and Bessarabia. It was decided to divide the Baltic states into spheres of interest: Estonia, geographically closest to Leningrad - the Soviet Union, Lithuania - Germany. A controversy has erupted over Latvia. Ribbentrop tried to get Libau and Vindava into the German sphere of influence, but the Soviet Union needed these ports, and Stalin knew that the agreement was more valuable to Hitler than the two ports and all of Latvia in addition. Hitler did not become stubborn and gave up Latvia, informing Ribbentrop of his decision in Moscow. In relation to the Polish state, Ribbentrop proposed dividing spheres of interest along the border of ethnic Poland, the “Curzon Line,” placing Western Belarus and Ukraine under the control of the USSR. But Stalin considered it possible to draw a dividing line along the Vistula, thus claiming to participate in deciding the fate of the Polish people. In general, the sphere of interests of the USSR was close to the borders of the Russian Empire.

After the signing of the documents, a weight was lifted from the shoulders of the negotiating participants - failure of the meeting would mean a strategic failure for both sides. The conversation went much more friendly.

The Soviet-German non-aggression pact, known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, was signed on the night of August 24, 1939 (the official date of its signing is considered to be the start of negotiations on August 23).

This agreement marked the beginning of a period of Soviet-German rapprochement and made it easier for Hitler to defeat Poland, which Germany attacked on September 1, 1939. Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3, marking the beginning of World War II. The USSR took advantage of this military conflict by occupying the western parts of Ukraine and Belarus, which were previously part of the Polish state. On September 28, a new Soviet-German treaty “On Friendship and Borders” was concluded, which formalized the division of the territory of the destroyed Polish state between the USSR and Germany. Having agreed to transfer all ethnic Polish territories to Germany, the USSR also received Lithuania into its sphere of influence, and began to establish its military-political control over the Baltic states.

NON-AGGRESSION TREATY BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE SOVIET UNION

USSR government and

German government

Article I

Both Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any violence, from any aggressive action and from any attack against each other, either separately or jointly with other powers.

Article II.

In the event that one of the Contracting Parties becomes the object of military action by a third power, the other Contracting Party will not support this power in any form.

Article III.

The Governments of both Contracting Parties will remain in future contact with each other for consultation in order to inform each other about matters affecting their common interests.

Article IV.

Neither of the Contracting Parties will participate in any grouping of powers that is directly or indirectly directed against the other party.

Article V

Article VI.

Article VII.

This treaty is subject to ratification as soon as possible. The exchange of instruments of ratification must take place in Berlin. The agreement comes into force immediately after its signing.

Secret additional protocol
to the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union

In any case, both governments will resolve this issue by way of friendly mutual agreement.

3. Regarding the southeast of Europe, the Soviet side emphasizes the USSR’s interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterest in these areas.

4. This protocol will be kept strictly confidential by both parties.

1939. Pre-war crisis in documents. M., 1992.

Eastern Europe between Hitler and Stalin. 1939-1941 M., 1999.

Documents of the foreign policy of the USSR. T.21.

Rozanov G.L. Stalin - Hitler. Documentary sketch of Soviet-German diplomatic relations, 1939-1941. M., 1991.

Semiryaga M.I. Secrets of Stalin's diplomacy. 1939-1941. M., 1992.

Fleischhauer I. Pact. Hitler, Stalin and the initiative of German diplomacy 1938-1939. M., 1991.

Shubin A.V. The world is on the edge of the abyss. From global crisis to world war. 1929-1941. M., 2004.

What were the reasons for the Soviet-German rapprochement in 1939?

Why did the German leadership insist on signing a non-aggression pact with Germany in the second half of August 1939?

How did Soviet-German relations in 1939 depend on the progress of Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations?

What changes were made to the draft documents during the negotiations on August 23-24, 1939?