Creation of the atomic bomb in the USSR. White Archipelago. new unknown pages of the "atomic project of the USSR" Scientific director of the atomic project in the USSR

Atomic project On August 20, 1945, the State Defense Committee adopted decision No. 9887 on the creation of a Special Committee, which was to provide state leadership in solving the nuclear problem. By decision of Joseph Stalin, this body was headed by Lavrentiy

The Great Atomic Bluff On September 25, 1949, the Pravda newspaper published a TASS report. It was in this way that the Kremlin in those years notified the public (mainly international) about what the government of the Soviet Union thought about certain events in the world

The first atomic explosion Although both Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill knew that the United States of America was preparing to test a bomb of enormous destructive power. Harry Truman became aware of this action only on the day he was sworn in as the new president.

Secret atomic report On January 17, 1946, the report, the preparation of which was entrusted to Kurchatov, Kikoin, Vannikov, Pervukhin and Zavenyagin, was prepared. It was given a business title: “On the state of work on the production and use of atomic energy.” Beria, Malenkov and

Secret atomic test site Throughout the summer of 1949, the test site near Semipalatinsk was preparing to conduct the country's first atomic experiment. Electrophysicist Vladimir Komelkov said: “In early August 1949, I went with most of the employees for testing to a remote

47. They helped create the atomic shield of the Motherland. The Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 died down long ago, the ice of the Cold War melted, but the memory of those people who defended their Fatherland from the fascist invasion is still preserved in people’s hearts. Still

23. Atomic project The United States of America clearly demonstrated its monopoly on atomic weapons in 1945 by conducting tests at Alamogordo and dropping bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Then the US military, for the purpose of blackmail, began

Research in the field of nuclear physics in the USSR has been carried out since 1918. In 1937 The first cyclotron in Europe was launched at the Radium Institute (Leningrad). November 25, 1938 By decree of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences (AS) of the USSR, a permanent commission on the atomic nucleus was created. It included S. Vavilov, A. Iofe, A. Alikhanov, I. Kurchatov and others (in 1940 they were joined by V. Khlopin and I. Gurevich). By this time, nuclear research was carried out in more than ten scientific institutes. In the same year, the Commission on Heavy Water was formed under the USSR Academy of Sciences (later transformed into the Commission on Isotopes). In September 1939 Construction of a powerful cyclotron began in Leningrad, and in April 1940. it was decided to build a pilot plant to produce approximately 15kg. heavy water per year. But due to the outbreak of war, these plans were not realized. In May 1940 N. Semenov, Y. Zeldovich, Yu. Khariton (Institute of Chemical Physics) proposed a theory for the development of a nuclear chain reaction in uranium. In the same year, work was accelerated to search for new deposits of uranium ores. In the late 30s - early 40s, many physicists already had an idea of ​​what (in general terms) an atomic bomb should look like. The idea is to quickly concentrate in one place a certain (more than critical mass) amount of material that is fissile under the influence of neutrons (with the emission of new neutrons). After which an avalanche-like increase in the number of atomic decays will begin in it - a chain reaction with the release of a huge amount of energy - an explosion will occur. The problem was to obtain a sufficient amount of fissile material. The only such substance found in nature in acceptable quantities is the isotope of uranium with a mass number (the total number of protons and neutrons in the nucleus) of 235 (uranium-235). In natural uranium, the content of this isotope does not exceed 0.71% (99.28% uranium-238); moreover, the content of natural uranium in the ore is, at best, 1%. The separation of uranium-235 from natural uranium was a rather difficult problem. An alternative to uranium, as it soon became clear, was plutonium-239. It is practically never found in nature (it is 100 times less than uranium-235). It is possible to obtain it in an acceptable concentration in nuclear reactors by irradiating uranium-238 with neutrons. Building such a reactor presented another problem. The third problem was how it was possible to collect the required mass of fissile material in one place. In the process of even very rapid convergence of subcritical parts, fission reactions begin in them. The energy released in this case may not allow most of the atoms to “take part” in the fission process, and they will fly apart without having time to react. In 1940 V. Spinel and V. Maslov from the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology submitted an application for the invention of an atomic weapon based on the use of a chain reaction of spontaneous fission of a supercritical mass of uranium-235, which is formed from several subcritical ones, separated by an explosive impenetrable to neutrons, destroyed by detonation (although “workability "of such a charge raises great doubts; a certificate for the invention was nevertheless obtained, but only in 1946). The Americans intended to use the so-called cannon design for their first bombs (the American nuclear project will be discussed in detail on a separate page on the site). It actually used a cannon barrel with the help of which one subcritical part of the fissile material was shot into another (it soon became clear that such a scheme was not suitable for plutonium due to insufficient approach speed), July 30, 1940. A commission on the problem of uranium was created in the Academy of Sciences. Its members included Khlopin, V. Vernadsky, Iofe, A. Fersman, Vavilov, P. Kapitsa, Khariton, Kurchatov, etc. However, work in this area was not yet aimed at studying the possibility of creating an explosive device, but was a scientific -research program. Work plan for 1940-41. provided for: - research into the possibility of a chain reaction on natural uranium; - clarification of the physical data necessary for assessing the development of a chain reaction on uranium-235; - study of various methods for separating uranium isotopes; - research into the possibilities of producing volatile organic compounds of uranium; - study of the state of the uranium raw material base. At the end of 1940 F. Lange, Maslov and Spinel proposed using ultracentrifuges to separate uranium isotopes. April 15, 1941 A resolution was issued by the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) on the construction of a powerful cyclotron in Moscow. But after the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, almost all work in the field of nuclear physics was stopped. Many nuclear physicists ended up at the front or were reoriented to other, as it seemed then, more pressing topics. So reserve private Kurchatov dealt with the problem of demagnetization of warships on the Black Sea. In 1941 G. Flerov, who volunteered for the front, sketches a diagram of the structure of an atomic bomb (similar to the American cannon diagram) in a simple student notebook. At the beginning of April 1942 he sent a letter to Stalin in which he writes that for 10 months he has been trying to “break through the wall with his head” and draw attention to the nuclear problem. “This is the last letter after which I lay down my arms and wait for this problem to be solved in Germany, England or the USA. The results will be so enormous that there will be no concern about who is to blame for the fact that this work was abandoned in our Union...” The letter would hardly have had any effect (nobody knew Flerov in the Kremlin) if by that time intelligence information had not accumulated about attempts by England, the USA and Germany to create nuclear weapons. Since 1939 Both the GRU of the Red Army and the 1st Directorate of the NKVD were collecting information on the nuclear issue. The first message about plans to create an atomic bomb came from D. Cairncross in October 1940. This issue was discussed at the British Science Committee, where Cairncross worked. Summer 1941 The Tube Alloys project to create an atomic bomb was approved. By the beginning of the war, England was one of the leaders in nuclear research, largely thanks to German scientists who fled here when Hitler came to power, one of them was a member of the KPD K. Fuchs. In the autumn of 1941 he went to the Soviet Embassy and reported that he had important information about a powerful new weapon. To communicate with him, S. Kramer and radio operator “Sonya” - R. Kuchinskaya were allocated. The first radiograms to Moscow contained information about the gas diffusion method for separating uranium isotopes and about a plant in Wales being built for this purpose. After six transmissions, communication with Fuchs was lost. At the end of 1943 Soviet intelligence officer in the USA Semenov (“Twain”) reported that E. Fermi carried out the first nuclear chain reaction in Chicago. The information came from the physicist Pontecorvo. At the same time, closed scientific works of Western scientists on atomic energy for 1940-42 were received from England through foreign intelligence. They confirmed that great progress had been made in creating the atomic bomb. The wife of the famous sculptor Konenkov also worked for intelligence, and having become close to the leading physicists Oppenheimer and Einstein, she influenced them for a long time. Another resident in the USA, L. Zarubina, found a way to L. Szilard and was included in Oppenheimer’s circle of people. With their help, it was possible to introduce reliable agents into Oak Ridge, Los Alamos and the Chicago Laboratory - centers of American nuclear research. In 1944 information on the American atomic bomb was transmitted to Soviet intelligence by: K. Fuchs, T. Hall, S. Sake, B. Pontecorvo, D. Greenglass and the Rosenbergs. At the beginning of February 1944. People's Commissar of the NKVD L. Beria held an extended meeting of the heads of NKVD intelligence. During the meeting, it was decided to create department “C” in order to coordinate the collection of information on the atomic problem coming through the NKVD and the GRU of the Red Army and its generalization. September 27, 1945 the department was organized, leadership was entrusted to the GB Commissioner P. Sudoplatov. In January 1945 Fuchs conveyed a description of the design of the first atomic bomb. Among other things, reconnaissance obtained materials on the electromagnetic separation of uranium isotopes, data on the operation of the first reactors, specifications for the production of uranium and plutonium bombs, data on the design of a system of focusing explosive lenses and the dimensions of the critical mass of uranium and plutonium, on plutonium-240, on the time and the sequence of operations for the production and assembly of a bomb, the method of activating the bomb initiator; about the construction of isotope separation plants, as well as diary entries about the first test explosion of an American bomb in July 1945. Information received through intelligence channels facilitated and accelerated the work of Soviet scientists. Western experts believed that an atomic bomb in the USSR could be created no earlier than in 1954-55. but it happened on August 29, 1949. When in 1992 Academician Khariton was asked whether it was true that the first Soviet atomic bomb was a double of the first American one, he replied: “Our first atomic bomb is a copy of the American one. And I would consider any other action at that time unacceptable in the state sense. The timing was important: whoever has atomic weapons dictates the political conditions.” In April 1942 People's Commissar of the Chemical Industry M. Pervukhin, by order of Stalin, was familiarized with materials on work on the atomic bomb abroad. Pervukhin proposed selecting a group of specialists to evaluate the information presented in this report. On Ioffe’s recommendation, the group included young scientists Kurchatov, Alikhanov and I. Kikoin. In a written conclusion, they gave a positive assessment of the reliability of the information and proposed organizing broader research work in nuclear physics in the USSR, for which they proposed establishing a special committee. September 28, 1942 Stalin signed the GKO decree “On the organization of work on uranium” which read: “... Oblige the USSR Academy of Sciences to resume work on studying the feasibility of using atomic energy by fissioning the uranium nucleus and submit the GKO by April 1, 1943. report on the possibility of creating a uranium bomb or uranium fuel. For this purpose, the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences should organize a special laboratory of the atomic nucleus at the Academy of Sciences.” Ioffe was appointed responsible for the implementation of the nuclear research program at the USSR Academy of Sciences, V. Molotov supervised the work under the State Defense Committee, and Beria was appointed his deputy. It was planned for March 1943. build the first separation plants and obtain a small amount of enriched (235th isotope) uranium. The main obstacle to the implementation of the program was the lack of uranium. November 27, 1942 The State Defense Committee issued a decree “On uranium mining”. The resolution provided for the creation of a special institute and the start of work on geological exploration, extraction and processing of raw materials. Since 1943 The People's Commissariat of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy (NKCM) has started mining at the Tabashar mine in Tajikistan and processing uranium ore with a plan of 4 tons. uranium salts per year. At the beginning of 1943 Previously mobilized scientists were recalled from the front. Thus, a practical program began to be implemented, the purpose of which was to study the possibility of creating nuclear weapons. At the end of January, Kurchatov and Alikhanov drew up a work plan for the Laboratory for 1943. which included: - research into the fission process of uranium (this required the production of metallic uranium and the creation of a cyclotron); - development at the Institute of Physics and Mathematics of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR of a technology for separating uranium isotopes by the centrifugation method (the examination was entrusted to Kikoin); - production at the Radium Institute of uranium-235 enriched to 4% (by thermal diffusion method), 10 kg. metallic natural uranium and 1 kg. uranium hexafluoride (and study of its properties); - development of a method for separating isotopes by gas diffusion under the leadership of Kurchatov, Kikoin, Alikhanov; - research into the possibility of separating uranium isotopes by the electromagnetic method, led by A. Artsimovich. In pursuance of the decree of the State Defense Committee on February 11, 1943. Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences was organized, the head of which was Kurchatov (in 1949 it was renamed the Laboratory of Measuring Instruments of the USSR Academy of Sciences - LIPAN, in 1956, on its basis, the Institute of Atomic Energy was created, and currently it is the RRC "Kurchatov Institute - here”), which was supposed to coordinate all work on the implementation of the atomic project. At first, Laboratory No. 2 huddled in several rooms and the basement of the Seismological Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences on Pyzhevsky Lane and partly in the premises of the Institute of General and Inorganic Chemistry of the USSR Academy of Sciences on Kaluzhskaya Street. At that time, only 50 people were working on the uranium problem in the USSR, and about 700 researchers in the USA. The main core of the Laboratory’s staff initially consisted of personnel from the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology. Soon Alikhanov, Artsimovich, Kikoin, Kurchatov, I. Pomeranchuk, K. Petrzhak, Flerov were returned to Moscow from different cities of the USSR, where they were evacuated (in 1944, after the Institute of Chemical Physics returned to Moscow, Zeldovich, Khariton joined the work and others of his employees). A place for the new organization was allocated on the northern outskirts of Moscow in Pokrovsky-Streshnev in a dense forest with small clearings and an artillery shooting range. On the allocated territory, construction began on buildings for a large cyclotron, an underground laboratory for experiments using artillery pieces for a “cannon” version of the bomb, and an experimental uranium-graphite boiler. After the blockade of Leningrad was lifted, the cyclotron equipment that had been preserved there was taken to Moscow (it was launched on September 25, 1944, and in 1946 the first 7 micrograms of plutonium were obtained from it). The Laboratory began work on studying the possibility of isotope separation using gaseous uranium hexafluoride (UF 6). In 1944 We began to study the electromagnetic method. In the same year, the Laboratory of Electrical Phenomena at the Ural Branch of the Academy of Sciences, under the leadership of Kikoin, was involved in the development of methods for separating uranium. At the end of 1943 Kurchatov presented a report on the state of work on the atomic problem in which it was reported that: - tests of a centrifuge for separating uranium isotopes began in September, but the experiments were delayed due to the lack of the required amount of uranium hexafluoride; - at NII-42 of the People's Commissariat of the Chemical Industry a small amount of uranium hexafluoride was obtained, and at the Institute of Rare Metals metallic uranium was accumulated (the Radium Institute could not cope with these tasks); - a design for an experimental installation for producing heavy water for a nuclear reactor was developed and submitted for production; - the project of the gas diffusion machine assigned to TsAGI has not been completed, but Laboratory No. 2 is creating a simplified model of the installation; - the experiments carried out showed that the products of graphite plants of the USSR are unsuitable for use in a uranium-graphite reactor. In December 1943 NII-42 received the task of speeding up work on the production of uranium hexafluoride and from April 1944. produce it in 10kg batches. per month, develop a plant project with a capacity of 100 kg. per day. In 1944 Soviet intelligence received a reference book on uranium-graphite reactors, which contained very valuable information on determining reactor parameters. But the country did not yet have the uranium necessary to power even a small experimental nuclear reactor. September 28, 1944 The government obliged the USSR NKCM to hand over uranium and uranium salts to the State Fund and assigned the task of storing them to Laboratory No. 2. In November 1944. a large group of Soviet specialists, under the leadership of the head of the 4th special department of the NKVD V. Kravchenko, went to liberated Bulgaria to study the results of geological exploration of the Goten deposit. December 8, 1944 The State Defense Committee issued a decree on the transfer of the mining and processing of uranium ores from the NKMC to the jurisdiction of the 9th Directorate of the NKVD, created in the Main Directorate of Mining and Metallurgical Enterprises (GU GMP). In March 1945 Major General S. Egorov, who previously held the position of deputy, was appointed head of the 2nd department (mining and metallurgy) of the 9th Directorate of the NKVD. Head of the Main Department of Dalstroy. In January 1945 As part of the 9th Directorate, on the basis of separate laboratories of the State Institute of Rare Metals (Giredmet) and one of the defense plants, NII-9 (now VNIINM) is organized to study uranium deposits, solve problems of processing uranium raw materials, obtaining metallic uranium and plutonium. By this time, approximately one and a half tons of uranium ore were arriving from Bulgaria per week. Back in mid-1944. Khariton prepared proposals for a draft decree of the State Defense Committee on measures to develop the design of an atomic bomb. It was supposed to organize a special group in Laboratory No. 2 to create its prototype. As in the American project, it was supposed to use a chain reaction of fission of uranium-235 or plutonium-239 by quickly bringing the two halves of the charge together. The critical mass of the nuclear charge, according to preliminary estimates, was about 10 kg. The weight of an atomic bomb is equivalent in power to an explosion of 10-50 thousand tons. TNT could be from 3 to 5 tons. Since March 1945 After the NKGB received information from the United States about the design of an atomic bomb based on the principle of implosion (compression of fissile material by the explosion of a conventional explosive), work began on a new design that had obvious advantages over the cannon one. In a note from V. Makhanev to Beria in April 1945. regarding the timing of the creation of the atomic bomb, it was said that the diffusion plant at Laboratory No. 2 for the production of uranium-235 was supposed to be launched in 1947. Its productivity was supposed to be 25 kg. uranium per year, which should have been enough for two bombs (in fact, the American uranium bomb required 65 kg of uranium-235). During the battles for Berlin on May 5, 1945. The property of the Physics Institute of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society was discovered. On May 9, a commission headed by A. Zavenyagin was sent to Germany to search for scientists working there on the Uranium project and accept materials on the uranium problem. A large group of German scientists was taken to the Soviet Union along with their families. Among them were Nobel laureates G. Hertz and N. Riehl, professors R. Deppel, M. Volmer, G. Pose, P. Thyssen, M. von Ardene, Geib (a total of about two hundred specialists, including 33 doctors of science). Many went, as they say, voluntarily, signing lucrative contracts. For the period from September 1 to December 10, 1945. 219 wagons of various equipment were sent to the USSR, including three cyclotrons, a number of high-voltage installations, and equipment for measuring radioactivity. In addition, 100 tons were exported. uranium concentrate (some sources say almost 300 tons of oxide and 7 tons of uranium metal) and some heavy water. At the beginning of 1946 Kurchatov wrote: “Until May 1945. there was no hope of implementing a uranium-graphite boiler since we only had 7 tons at our disposal. uranium oxide and there was no hope that the required 100t. uranium will be produced before 1948.” German uranium made it possible to significantly speed up the creation of the atomic bomb. All matters related to the development of deposits and the extraction of uranium ore were supervised by the Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD Zavenyagin. In May 1945 According to the decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR, the construction of the mining and chemical processing plant No. 6 began. Colonel of the NKVD B. Chirkov was appointed head of construction (director). Raw materials for processing were to be supplied from the Tajik, Uzbek and Kyrgyz republics (Tyuyamuyunskoye, Tabosharskoye, Adrasmanskoye, Maili-Suiskoye and Uygur-Sayskoye fields). Unfortunately, the uranium content in the ore of these deposits was low (0.05 - 0.07%). For the entire 1945 Mining Department No. 6 issued 7 tons. uranium salts. October 16, 1945 37t. uranium products containing 24.7 tons. uranium were sent from Czechoslovakia to Moscow. November 23, 1945 An agreement was concluded with Czechoslovakia providing for the supply of ore mined there to Soviet enterprises. In October 1946 a similar agreement was concluded with the eastern zone of Germany. In almost the first years, Plant No. 6 processed raw materials from Germany and Czechoslovakia, the uranium content of which reached 0.25%. Without these supplies, the deadline for the creation of atomic weapons in the USSR would have been delayed. June 27, 1946 Mining and chemical plant No. 7 was formed to develop Baltic uranium-bearing shale. August 14, 1947 In Ukraine, the construction of plant No. 906 (now the Pridneprovsky Chemical Plant) began for the processing of ores from the Pervomaisky and Zheltorechensky uranium deposits. Prisoners were widely used to work in the mines and build processing factories. No one counted how many of them were killed; they were buried in mass graves. The explosions of atomic bombs over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki made a deep impression on Stalin. August 17, 1945 He called the People's Commissar of Ammunition Vannikov and instructed him to speed up the creation of the Soviet bomb. August 20, 1945 By decision of the Politburo and the State Defense Committee, a Special Committee on Atomic Energy was formed with emergency powers, reporting directly to the Politburo. Its tasks included: - development of research work in the field of atomic energy use; - creation of a raw material base for uranium mining; - organization of industrial processing of uranium; - production of special equipment and materials as well as construction of nuclear power plants; - development and production of the atomic bomb. Beria was appointed head, and Vannikov was his deputy. The committee included Kapitsa and Kurchatov (who became the scientific director of the program). At the same time, a Technical Council headed by Vannikov was formed under the Special Committee to consider scientific and technical issues. The council included Alikhanov, I. Voznesensky, Zavenyagin, Ioffe, Kapitsa, Kikoin, Kurchatov, Khlopin, Khariton, etc. The council had four commissions: on the electromagnetic separation of uranium isotopes (Ioffe), on the production of heavy water (Kapitsa) , on the study of plutonium (Khlopin), on methods of analytical research (Vinogradov) and one section on labor protection (Parin). The necessary decisions on nuclear development were prepared by committee members, and Beria put a facsimile of Stalin’s signature on them. The fact that Beria became the head of the atomic project was natural. As the head of the NKVD, he received intelligence data on the work carried out in England and the United States in the field of using atomic energy and was fully aware of events in the creation of nuclear weapons. In addition, the NKVD had at its disposal a huge amount of free labor in the concentration camps. Even before the war, the “GULAG archipelago” played a significant role in the country’s economy. In 1940 The NKVD performed 3% of all capital work in the country's national economy. During the war, the economic role of the NKVD increased even more. By government decree of October 8, 1946. Glavpromstroy NKVD was approved as the main construction company of the PGU. August 30, 1945 For the direct management of research, design, engineering organizations and industrial enterprises for the use of intra-atomic energy of uranium and the production of atomic bombs, the First Main Directorate (PGU), subordinate to the Special Committee, was formed under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Vannikov was appointed head of the PSU and deputy chairman of the Special Committee; Zavenyagin was appointed first deputy. Beria was instructed to “take measures to organize overseas intelligence work to obtain more complete technical and economic information on the uranium industry and atomic bombs, entrusting him with the leadership of all intelligence work in this area carried out by intelligence agencies (NKGB, Red Army, etc. )". December 10, 1945 an engineering and technical council was created under a special committee to deal with the creation of the industrial base of the nuclear project (in April 1946, it was merged with the technical council under the special committee into a single scientific and technical council of PSU, headed by Vannikov). The council had six sections: - for the design and construction of plants for the production of plutonium (Pervukhin, Kurchatov); - on the design and construction of plants for gas diffusion separation of uranium isotopes (Malyshev, Kikoin); - on the design and construction of installations for the separation of uranium isotopes by the electromagnetic method (G. Aleksenko, Artsimovich); - on the design of installations for isotope separation (A. Kasatkin, M. Kornfeld); - on the design and construction of mining and metallurgical enterprises (Zavenyagin, N. Pravdyuk); - instrument engineering (N. Borisov). In 1945 The special committee adopted a resolution on the additional involvement of a number of institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences and other scientific institutions in work on the atomic project. Thus, the Colloidal Electrochemical Institute (headed by A. Frumkin) and the Institute of Inorganic Chemistry (I. Chernyaev) were tasked with studying the chemical properties of plutonium and developing industrial methods for its isolation from nuclear fuel. The Institute of Chemical Physics (Semenov) conducted research on new methods for separating uranium, the Ural Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences (P. Bardin) was tasked with using Professor Lange’s centrifugal machine to separate uranium isotopes. German specialists who had certain results in this area were involved in the development of nuclear technologies. December 19, 1945 By government decree, the 9th Directorate of the NKVD was reformed into the Directorate of Special Institutes. To do this, laboratories “A” (where von Ardene’s group was engaged in the separation of isotopes by magnetic method) and “G” (here Hertz’s group was engaged in the separation of isotopes by gas diffusion) were transferred from the jurisdiction of the PGU to the jurisdiction of the 9th Directorate of the NKVD, with their renaming Institutes "A" and "D". At Institute “A”, a group led by Dr. M. Steenbeck carried out work on the creation of a gas centrifuge. To ensure their activities, special facilities “Sinop” and “Agudzery” were formed in Sukhumi, subordinate to the 9th Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR. The NKVD was instructed to organize Institute “B” using German specialists who could not be included in other institutes and to organize Laboratory “B” using prisoner specialists and German specialists subject to isolation. Institute “B” (director A. Uralets) was located in the Sungul sanatorium near Kasli. The radiobiological department there was headed by N. Timofeev-Ressovsky. A group of German scientists also worked here. Later, the Federal Nuclear Center “Chelyabinsk-70” arose here. Laboratory “B” was located in Obninsk. Physicists worked here under the guidance of Professor Pose. Now the Institute of Physics and Energy is located in Obninsk, where the first nuclear power plant of the USSR was launched. Professor Doppel worked on heavy water reactors for Alikhanov. A real find for Soviet science was the former St. Petersburg resident Ril, a specialist in uranium processing and purification, sent to plant No. 12 in Elektrostal. Subsequently, he became the director of one of the closed research institutes (he was engaged in research in the field of radiochemistry), and received the Stalin Prize of the first degree, the Order of Lenin and the title of Hero of Socialist Labor for his work. Since 1953 Some German specialists were no longer allowed to participate in secret developments. In April 1955 they all returned to Germany, with the majority choosing the GDR as their place of residence, and the Hero of Socialist Labor Riehl went to Munich. Not all scientists managed to return to Germany. Dr. Geib tried to escape from the USSR, breaking into the Canadian embassy, ​​he asked to be given political asylum. He was kicked out of the building and told to “come back the next day.” A few days later, his wife received the scientist’s personal belongings with notification that her husband had died. In September 1945 At the Technical Council of the Special Committee, reports were heard from Kikoin and Kapitsa on uranium enrichment by the gas diffusion method and by Ioffe and Artsimovich on uranium enrichment by the electromagnetic method. December 27, 1945 a government decree was issued on the creation of OKB "Elektrosila" (now NPO "Electrophysics") for the development of electromagnetic separation of uranium isotopes (chief - D. Efremov, scientific supervisor Artsimovich) and on the organization at the Leningrad Kirov Plant (LKZ) and the Artillery Plant named after. Stalin (plant No. 42, later Gorky Machine-Building Plant - GMZ) OKB for the creation of multi-stage installations for gaseous diffusion separation of uranium according to the design of Voznesensky and Kikoin (Laboratory No. 2). October 8, 1946 Beria sent a letter to Stalin about the design of a plant for the electromagnetic separation of uranium. It noted that Laboratory No. 2 (work manager - Artsimovich), together with the Design Bureau of the Elektrosila plant and the Central Vacuum Laboratory, created a pilot plant with a magnet weighing 60 tons. with a productivity of 4 to 5 mcg/hour 80% uranium-235. The special committee considered it necessary to begin the construction of an industrial plant for the electromagnetic separation of uranium. Along with gas diffusion and electromagnetic methods, the USSR was developing centrifuge and thermal diffusion technologies. December 17, 1945 Laboratory No. 4 was formed to develop this enrichment method using gas centrifuges (headed by Lange). The implementation of the centrifugal separation method turned out to be technically extremely difficult. It was still managed to be resolved, but much later. The first industrial installation for the centrifugal separation of uranium isotopes was created at the LKZ Design Bureau and in 1957. At plant No. 813, the world's first production of uranium enrichment using the gas centrifuge method was launched. Its main advantage, compared to diffusion, is its low cost and significantly higher efficiency. The transition to gas centrifuge technology, carried out in 1966–72. made it possible to increase productivity by almost 2.5 times and reduce energy consumption by 8–20 times. The creation of a nuclear explosive device using plutonium-239 required the construction of an industrial nuclear reactor to produce it. Even a small experimental reactor required about 36 tons. metallic uranium, 9t. uranium dioxide and about 500t. pure graphite. If the graphite problem has been solved. by August 1943 managed to develop and master a special technological process for producing graphite of the required purity, and in May 1944 its production was established at the Moscow Electrode Plant, then the required amount of uranium by the end of 1945. there was none in the country. The first technical specifications for the production of uranium dioxide and uranium metal for a research reactor were issued by Kurchatov in November 1944. The technology for producing metallic uranium and plutonium was developed at NII-9, in which a special department was created for this purpose under the leadership of Academician A. Bochvar. The development of the production of uranium metal was entrusted to plant No. 12 in Elektrostal. Equipment exported from Germany for reparations was installed in the production shops of the plant. At the plant, with the participation of scientists from NII-9 and Giredmet, the technology for producing products from metallic uranium was developed. The first uranium ingot (for an experimental reactor) of the required purity was obtained in the summer of 1945. At the end of the year, uranium was delivered to the plant from Germany. In the autumn of 1946 A group of German scientists led by Dr. Riehl arrived here. In parallel with the creation of uranium-graphite reactors, work was carried out on reactors based on uranium and heavy water. In September 1945 The State Defense Committee made a decision to organize the production of heavy water, and in October a decision was made to produce heavy water at the Chirchik Chemical Plant and the Moscow Electrolysis Plant. December 1, 1945 A resolution was adopted by the Council of People's Commissars on the organization of Laboratory No. 3 under the leadership of Alikhanov to solve the problem of creating a heavy water reactor. The advantage of such a reactor was an order of magnitude smaller amount of uranium required for its operation. In conditions of uranium shortage at the initial stage of work, this circumstance was especially important. At the same time, problems associated with the production of heavy water (in 1947, six plants produced only about 2.5 tons of heavy water, while an industrial boiler needed more than 20 tons) and specific technological problems in creating heavy water reactors determined the first plan for the uranium-graphite direction. Nevertheless, work on heavy water reactors continued. In January 1947 a design assignment was formulated for Laboratory No. 3 and OKB Gidropress of the Podolsk plant for the development of an experimental heavy water reactor “FDC”. In April 1949 it was launched. In April 1948 A government decree was issued on the development of a project for an industrial heavy-water reactor. In August 1949 he was ready, and in the summer of 1949. construction of the first industrial heavy-water reactor OK-180 began at plant No. 817 (start-up took place on October 17, 1951). The question arises: why was it necessary to “spread forces” so much and move simultaneously in four directions? Justifying the need for this, Kurchatov in his Report in 1947. gives these numbers. The number of bombs that could be obtained from 1000 tons. uranium ore by different methods is 20 when using a uranium-graphite boiler, 50 when using the diffusion method, 70 when using the electromagnetic method, 40 when using “heavy” water. At the same time, although boilers with “heavy” water have a number of significant disadvantages, they have the advantage that they allow the use of thorium. Thus, although the uranium-graphite boiler made it possible to create an atomic bomb in the shortest possible time, it had the worst result in terms of complete use of raw materials. Taking into account the experience of the USA, where gas diffusion was chosen from the four methods of uranium separation studied, on December 21, 1945. The government decided to build plants No. 813 (now the Ural Electro-Mechanical Plant in Novouralsk) to produce highly enriched uranium-235 by gas diffusion and No. 817 (Chelyabinsk-40, now the Mayak chemical plant in Ozersk) for obtaining plutonium. The commissioning date for plant No. 817 is Q2. 1947 Plant No. 813 - September 1946 The corresponding special construction departments of the NKVD were created (No. 859 and 865). Construction began in 1946. without waiting for special equipment to be ready. When tests were carried out on multi-stage gas diffusion machines developed by OKB GMZ and OKB LKZ, it turned out that they were so complex that their operation was practically impossible. The concept of multi-stage machines turned out to be erroneous (the Americans used a large number of single-stage machines connected in series). The launch of plant No. 813 was postponed to September 1947. By the end of 1946. Two versions of new installations were ready - Gorky and Leningrad. After testing, they chose the machines of the Gorky Design Bureau (chief designer A Savin). At the beginning of 1946 Three departments were formed in Laboratory No. 2. Department “K”, under the leadership of Kurchatov, was engaged in the development of industrial production of plutonium on a uranium-graphite boiler and conducting nuclear physics research and measurements necessary to create a bomb, as well as issues of radiochemistry (primarily the separation of plutonium). Department “D”, under the leadership of Kikoin, was creating a diffusion plant to produce uranium-235 of 90% purity. Department “A”, under the leadership of Artsimovich, dealt with electromagnetic installations. Construction of an experimental uranium-graphite reactor on the territory of Laboratory No. 2 began in the spring of 1946. For the first laboratory reactor, a concrete pit 10 m long, wide and deep was built. As materials were received, uranium-graphite prisms were collected in the army tent (without waiting for the building to be built), on which they conducted experiments and looked for optimal reactor parameters (sizes of uranium blocks, pitch of their arrangement in graphite). In the already constructed building, five reactor blocks were laid, one after another. The latter was a sphere with a diameter of about 6 m, made of graphite blocks measuring 100 x 100 x 600 mm. in which 30 thousand holes were drilled to separate (with a certain pitch) uranium blocks. The sphere was surrounded by a reflector made of graphite blocks 800 mm thick. The reactor had three vertical channels for control rods and six horizontal experimental channels. And so on December 25, 1946. at 18 o'clock Moscow time, the first F-1 reactor in the USSR started operating. It had no cooling, and all instrumentation and control systems had to be invented on the fly. By this time, plant No. 817 was already under construction for the industrial production of plutonium. Development of the design of an industrial reactor began at the beginning of 1946. in two versions with horizontal and vertical arrangement of control rods. The first was in the design bureau of the Podolsk Machine-Building Plant (headed by B. Shelkovich), the second at the Moscow Research Institute of Chemical Engineering (N. Dollezhal). The vertical reactor could be located below ground level, which made it easier to protect, and the rods into the core could be easily lowered and lifted by a crane. Therefore, the choice was made in his favor. Already in June 1946. Kurchatov signed the reactor drawings. April 9, 1946 A government decree was adopted on the creation of a design bureau at Laboratory No. 2 for the development of nuclear weapons - KB-11, Zernov was appointed its head, Khariton was appointed chief designer. The search for a place to locate it began at the end of 1945. In April 1946 Plant No. 550, located in the village of Sarov (Arzamas-16), was chosen to house the design bureau. In the early years it was called “Object 550” or “Base-112”; currently it is VNIIEF. Construction, as always, was entrusted to the NKVD. To carry out construction work, a special construction organization was created - Construction Administration No. 880 of the NKVD. Since April 1946 the entire personnel of plant No. 550 was enrolled as workers and employees of Construction Administration No. 880. To complete the work in a short time, they used the usual methods of that time. May 6, 1946 The first batch of prisoners arrived, and the houses began to grow very quickly - the foundation was laid in the morning, the first floor was ready by lunchtime. At the end of 1946 About 10 thousand prisoners worked in construction. In parallel with the design bureau, the first production shops of pilot plants No. 1 and No. 2 were created. KB-11 had only 333 employees, including 15 scientists, 19 engineers and technicians. On October 29, 1949 The number of people working on the creation of the atomic bomb was 237,878. Of these, 1,173 scientific and engineering workers worked in Laboratory No. 2, 507 people worked in KB-11, of which 848 were scientific and engineering workers. By government decree of June 21, 1946. “On the plan for the deployment of KB-11 work at Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences,” the KB was given the task of creating two versions of bombs - uranium with cannon rapprochement and plutonium with spherical compression. Literally it sounded like this: “to create...Jet engine C (abbreviated as RDS) in two versions - using heavy fuel (option C-1) and using light fuel (option C-2)...". Later, “popular rumor” gave other options for deciphering the name of the atomic bomb: “Stalin’s jet engine”, “Russia does it itself”, “Motherland gives to Stalin”, etc. The test of the plutonium charge (RDS-1) was supposed to be carried out before January 1, 1948. uranium (RDS-2) - until June 1, 1948. To test atomic bombs (without nuclear charges), it was necessary to make five mock-ups of each bomb variant. Models of the plutonium bomb were supposed to be presented by March 1, 1948. and uranium - by January 1, 1949. In August 1947 A government decree was issued on the creation of Air Force Test Site No. 71 (Bagerovo, Crimea) for flight testing of atomic bomb models. July 1, 1946 technical specifications for an atomic bomb appeared. It consisted of 9 points and stipulated the type of fissile material, the method of transferring it to a critical state, the size and mass of the bomb, the timing of the operation of electric detonators, the requirements for a high-altitude fuse and self-destruction of the system in case of failure. The length of the bomb should not exceed 5 m. diameter - 1.5 m. and weight - 5t. In 1946 Technical specifications were also issued for the development of electric detonators, an explosive charge, an air bomb body and a radio sensor. At the Radium Institute in 1946. A technology was created for processing irradiated uranium in order to extract plutonium. The development of an explosive charge for the RDS-1 began at NII-6 at the end of 1945. from the creation of a 1:5 scale model according to Khariton’s verbal instructions. The model was developed by the beginning of 1946. and by the summer it was made in two copies; the model was tested at the NII-6 test site in Sofrino. By the end of 1946 The development of documentation for the full-scale charge began. Further development of the charge was carried out already in KB-11. To develop the contours of the bomb body, the Central Aero-Hydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI) was involved, where more than 100 models were blown in a wind tunnel until they found the optimal shape that ensured a stable, vibration-free flight of the bomb. During 1945-46. According to government regulations, more than 50 factories and combines of the heavy, chemical and radio industries of the USSR were transferred to the jurisdiction of the PSU, which were reconstructed for the needs of the PSU. The supply of component parts was carried out by a number of enterprises: - plants No. 48 and No. 12 PGU - ballistic housings and uranium blanks; - Leningrad plant “Bolshevik” - nuclear charge casings made of magnesium alloy, castings of which were supplied by plant No. 219 MAP; - plant No. 25 MAP - automation units and a number of devices; - plant No. 80 in Dzerzhinsk - parts from explosives; - OKB-700 Kirov plant in Chelyabinsk - barometric sensors. Research work in Sarov was planned to begin on October 1, 1946. but it soon became clear that the plans would not be fulfilled. January 9, 1947 Khariton made a report on the state of development of the atomic bomb at a meeting with Stalin. Due to construction delays, the new start date for work on KB-11 was postponed to May 15, 1947. By this time, three factory buildings had been built at the “facility”. About 100 panel houses received from Finland as part of reparations were erected for housing. At this time, four laboratories were already operating in KB-11: X-ray, deformation of metals, explosives, control of special items. Soon two more laboratories were organized: electrical and radio engineering, radiochemistry and special coatings. Since February 1947 The design department began work. In the spring of 1947 Exploratory blasting work began. Large-sized parts from conventional explosives were initially manufactured at NII-6, and then at pilot plant No. 2. The final assembly of the bomb was carried out at plant No. 1. In February 1947. By government decree, KB-11 was classified as a special security enterprise with the transformation of its territory into a closed security zone. The village of Sarov was removed from the administrative subordination of the Mordovian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Summer 1947 the perimeter of the zone was taken under military protection. Until the mid-50s, KB-11 employees and members of their families could not leave the zone even on vacation; only business trips were allowed. The commissioning dates for plants No. 817 and 813 were constantly postponed. It was not possible to build the main facility of Combine No. 817 (with a capacity of 70 g of metallic plutonium per day) - a uranium-graphite “boiler” - in a timely manner. In April 1947 Only the foundation pit was ready (depth 54m, diameter 110m). The launch was postponed to May 1948. The first copy of the plutonium bomb was supposed to be assembled at KB-11 in November 1948. In fact, the deadlines have shifted by another nine months. Plant No. 813 (with a production capacity of 140 g of uranium-235 metal per day) was scheduled to start operating on September 1, 1947. However, the first Gorky diffusion machines appeared only at the beginning of 1948. The launch of the plant was postponed to November 1948. For a plant for electromagnetic uranium separation (with a capacity of 80-150 g per day) by 1947. The design specifications were completed and the development of the technical design began. In June 1947 A government decree was issued on the construction of plant No. 814 (Sverdlovsk-45, now the Elektropribor plant in Lesnoy) for the electromagnetic separation of isotopes. The planned launch date for the plant is the end of 1949. Kurchatov had no confidence that he would soon master uranium enrichment methods. Obviously, therefore, he directed the main forces to uranium-graphite reactors, believing that this would most quickly lead to the creation of nuclear weapons. This was evident from his attitude towards object No. 813, which he visited very rarely and for only a short time. He visited object No. 817 much more often and stayed there for a long time. At the end of August 1947 Beria sends another letter to Stalin. It refers to the staffing of plants No. 817 and No. 813. The prepared draft Government Resolution provided for; “Mobilize in 1947. from enterprises of 30 ministries and from the Academy of Sciences 207 engineers, 142 technicians and 1076 skilled workers to staff plant No. 817 and the first stage of plant No. 813...” Stalin agreed with all the proposals and one day specialists living in different cities of the country and working in different enterprises, received a summons to appear at the district party committee, or at the local branch of the NKVD, or at the directorate where they were informed that on such and such a day and at such and such an hour they must report to the railway station and go to such and such a station. And there they will be told where to go next. The personnel issue was resolved simply then. In the spring of 1948 The two-year period given by Stalin to create the Soviet atomic bomb has expired. But by this time, let alone bombs, there were no fissile materials for its production. By government decree of February 8, 1948. a new production date for the RDS-1 bomb was set - March 1, 1949. June 10, 1948 a new decree was issued to supplement the work plan of KB-11. It obliged to produce before January 1, 1949. research into the possibility of creating new (improved) types of atomic bombs. By this time, it became clear that it was impractical to bring the RDS-2 bomb with a charge of Uranium-235 to the testing stage due to its low efficiency (in the American bomb dropped on Hiroshima, less than a kilogram of 64 kg of pure uranium-235 reacted). Work on RDS-2 was stopped in mid-1948. (the RDS-2 index was given to the second Soviet plutonium bomb of an improved design, tested in 1951). The use of Uranium-235 will not be abandoned because its use in a mixture with more expensive Plutonium made it possible to save the latter. The task of obtaining highly enriched uranium-235, as Kurchatov believed, turned out to be a much more complex technological task than the accumulation of plutonium. At the end of 1948 doubts arose that it would be possible to obtain uranium-235 of 90% purity using diffusion machines manufactured in Gorky (the gas losses in them were too great). Information about yet another failure in mastering the diffusion method caused a storm at the very top (legend has it that after Beria’s visit, three carriages with prisoners were sent from the factory to the camps). And yet the problem was solved. The same Gorky plant No. 92 developed and manufactured new diffusion machines (the old ones had to be dismantled) and in May 1949. The first stage of plant No. 813, the D-1 diffusion plant, was commissioned. In November 1949 The D-1 plant produced the first finished product in the form of uranium hexafluoride containing 75% of the U-235 isotope. At the same time, plant No. 814 for electromagnetic uranium enrichment was put into operation. After a series of events completed by 1950. diffusion technology was fully mastered and made it possible to obtain tens of kilograms of U-235 with 90% enrichment. The first industrial reactor “A” at Plant No. 817 was launched on June 19, 1948. (On June 22, 1948 it reached its design capacity and was decommissioned only in 1987). To separate produced plutonium from nuclear fuel, a radiochemical plant (plant “B”) was built as part of plant No. 817. Irradiated uranium blocks were dissolved and plutonium was separated from uranium using chemical methods. The concentrated plutonium solution was subjected to additional purification from highly active fission products in order to reduce its radiation activity when supplied to metallurgists. Radiochemical processes for the separation of plutonium were developed at the Radium Institute and tested in an experimental radiochemical workshop built at the F-1 reactor and part of NII-9. The first batch of irradiated uranium blocks arrived for processing on December 22, 1948. and the first finished product was received in February 1949. The plutonium concentrate obtained at Plant B, which consisted mainly of plutonium and lanthanum fluorides, was the raw material for producing weapons-grade plutonium. The final cleaning and production of parts from it was carried out at another enterprise of plant No. 817 - the chemical and metallurgical plant "B", the first stage of which was built on the site of ammunition depots near the city of Kyshtym. In April 1949 Plant "B" began manufacturing bomb parts from plutonium using NII-9 technology. At the same time, the first heavy water research reactor was launched. The development of the production of fissile materials was difficult, with numerous accidents during the elimination of the consequences of which there were cases of overexposure of personnel (at that time no attention was paid to such trifles). By July, a set of parts for the plutonium charge was ready. A group of physicists led by Flerov went to the plant to carry out physical measurements, and a group of theorists led by Zeldovich was sent to process the results of these measurements and calculate the efficiency values ​​and the probability of an incomplete explosion. July 27, 1949 A meeting was held at the plant, in which Kurchatov, Vannikov, Zavenyagin, Khariton, Zeldovich, Flerov and others participated. A decision was made on the final mass of the plutonium charge, the explosion power of which was estimated at 10 Kt. August 5, 1949 the plutonium charge was accepted by the commission headed by Khariton and sent by letter train to KB-11. By this time, work on creating an explosive device was almost completed here. Here, on the night of August 10-11, a control assembly of a nuclear charge was carried out, which received the index 501 for the RDS-1 atomic bomb. After this, the device was dismantled, the parts were inspected, packaged and prepared for shipment to the landfill. Thus, the Soviet atomic bomb was made in 2 years 8 months (in the USA it took 2 years 7 months). The test of the first Soviet nuclear charge 501 was carried out on August 29, 1949. at the Semipalatinsk test site (the device was located on the tower). The power of the explosion was 22Kt. The design of the charge was similar to the American “Fat Man”, although the electronic filling was of Soviet design. The atomic charge was
a multilayer structure in which plutonium was transferred to a critical state by compression by a converging spherical detonation wave. 5 kg was placed in the center of the charge. plutonium, in the form of two hollow hemispheres surrounded by a massive shell of uranium-238 (tamper). This shell served to inertially contain the core that was inflating during the chain reaction, so that as much of the plutonium as possible had time to react and, in addition, served as a reflector and moderator of neutrons (low-energy neutrons are most effectively absorbed by plutonium nuclei, causing their fission). The tamper was surrounded by an aluminum shell, which ensured uniform compression of the nuclear charge by the shock wave. A neutron initiator (fuse) was installed in the cavity of the plutonium core - a ball with a diameter of about 2 cm. made of beryllium, coated with a thin layer of polonium-210. When the nuclear charge of a bomb is compressed, the nuclei of polonium and beryllium come closer together, and the alpha particles emitted by radioactive polonium-210 knock out neutrons from beryllium, which initiate a chain nuclear fission reaction of plutonium-239. One of the most complex units was the explosive charge, which consisted of two layers. The inner layer consisted of two hemispherical bases made of an alloy of TNT and hexogen, the outer layer was assembled from individual elements with different detonation rates. The outer layer, designed to form a spherical converging detonation wave at the base of the explosive, is called the focusing system. For safety reasons, the installation of a unit containing fissile material was carried out immediately before using the charge. For this purpose, there was a through conical hole in the spherical explosive charge, which was closed with an explosive plug, and in the outer and inner casings there were holes that were closed with lids. The power of the explosion was due to the fission of nuclei of approximately 1 kg. plutonium, the remaining 4 kg. They didn’t have time to react and were uselessly scattered. During the implementation of the program for creating RDS-1, many new ideas arose for improving nuclear charges (increasing the utilization rate of fissile material, reducing dimensions and weight). New types of charges have become more powerful, more compact, and “more elegant” compared to the first, but this is a topic for a separate article. In addition to the atomic charge tested on August 29 by the pilot production of KB-11, by the end of 1949. two more RDS-1s were manufactured. By Government Decree of December 1, 1949 Department No. 3 for the assembly of finished products was created at PSU. V. Alferov was appointed its head. The department's task was to organize and prepare facilities for serial production of nuclear weapons. In 1950 KB-11 pilot production produced nine more (instead of seven according to plan) RDS-1 atomic bombs. By March 1, 1951 (before the launch of the first serial plant No. 551 for the production of atomic bombs at its design capacity), the arsenal of the Soviet Union had 15 atomic (plutonium) bombs of the RDS-1 type, and by the end of 1951. there were 29 of them (including 3 manufactured by a serial plant); some sources say that only 5 bombs of the RDS-1 type were manufactured. Both of them do not fit well with the table of the number of nuclear charges in the USSR given on the page “Nuclear ammunition". For 1952 It was planned to manufacture 35 atomic bombs by KB-11 (experimental and serial production), and in 1953. – 44.

In the USA and USSR, work began simultaneously on atomic bomb projects. In August 1942, the secret Laboratory No. 2 began to operate in one of the buildings located in the courtyard of Kazan University. The head of this facility was Igor Kurchatov, the Russian “father” of the atomic bomb. At the same time, in August, near Santa Fe, New Mexico, in the building of a former local school, a “Metallurgical Laboratory”, also secret, began operating. It was led by Robert Oppenheimer, the “father” of the atomic bomb from America.

It took a total of three years to complete the task. The first US bomb was blown up at the test site in July 1945. Two more were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August. It took seven years for the birth of the atomic bomb in the USSR. The first explosion took place in 1949.

Igor Kurchatov: short biography

The "father" of the atomic bomb in the USSR, was born in 1903, on January 12. This event took place in the Ufa province, in today's city of Sima. Kurchatov is considered one of the founders of peaceful purposes.

He graduated with honors from the Simferopol men's gymnasium, as well as a vocational school. In 1920, Kurchatov entered the Tauride University, the physics and mathematics department. Just 3 years later, he successfully graduated from this university ahead of schedule. The “father” of the atomic bomb began working at the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology in 1930, where he headed the physics department.

The era before Kurchatov

Back in the 1930s, work related to atomic energy began in the USSR. Chemists and physicists from various scientific centers, as well as specialists from other countries, took part in all-Union conferences organized by the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Radium samples were obtained in 1932. And in 1939 the chain reaction of fission of heavy atoms was calculated. The year 1940 became a landmark year in the nuclear field: the design of an atomic bomb was created, and methods for producing uranium-235 were proposed. Conventional explosives were first proposed to be used as a fuse to initiate a chain reaction. Also in 1940, Kurchatov presented his report on the fission of heavy nuclei.

Research during the Great Patriotic War

After the Germans attacked the USSR in 1941, nuclear research was suspended. The main Leningrad and Moscow institutes that dealt with problems of nuclear physics were urgently evacuated.

The head of strategic intelligence, Beria, knew that Western physicists considered atomic weapons an achievable reality. According to historical data, back in September 1939, Robert Oppenheimer, the leader of the work on creating an atomic bomb in America, came to the USSR incognito. The Soviet leadership could have learned about the possibility of obtaining these weapons from the information provided by this “father” of the atomic bomb.

In 1941, intelligence data from Great Britain and the USA began to arrive in the USSR. According to this information, intensive work has been launched in the West, the goal of which is the creation of nuclear weapons.

In the spring of 1943, Laboratory No. 2 was created to produce the first atomic bomb in the USSR. The question arose about who should be entrusted with its leadership. The list of candidates initially included about 50 names. Beria, however, chose Kurchatov. He was summoned in October 1943 to a viewing in Moscow. Today the scientific center that grew out of this laboratory bears his name - the Kurchatov Institute.

In 1946, on April 9, a decree was issued on the creation of a design bureau at Laboratory No. 2. Only at the beginning of 1947 were the first production buildings, which were located in the Mordovian Nature Reserve, ready. Some of the laboratories were located in monastery buildings.

RDS-1, the first Russian atomic bomb

They called the Soviet prototype RDS-1, which, according to one version, meant special." After some time, this abbreviation began to be deciphered somewhat differently - "Stalin's Jet Engine." In documents to ensure secrecy, the Soviet bomb was called a "rocket engine."

It was a device with a power of 22 kilotons. The USSR carried out its own development of atomic weapons, but the need to catch up with the United States, which had gone ahead during the war, forced domestic science to use intelligence data. The basis for the first Russian atomic bomb was the Fat Man, developed by the Americans (pictured below).

It was this that the United States dropped on Nagasaki on August 9, 1945. "Fat Man" worked on the decay of plutonium-239. The detonation scheme was implosive: the charges exploded along the perimeter of the fissile substance and created a blast wave that “compressed” the substance located in the center and caused a chain reaction. This scheme was later found to be ineffective.

The Soviet RDS-1 was made in the form of a large diameter and mass free-falling bomb. The charge of an explosive atomic device was made from plutonium. The electrical equipment, as well as the ballistic body of the RDS-1, were domestically developed. The bomb consisted of a ballistic body, a nuclear charge, an explosive device, as well as equipment for automatic charge detonation systems.

Uranium shortage

Soviet physics, taking the American plutonium bomb as a basis, was faced with a problem that had to be solved in an extremely short time: plutonium production had not yet begun in the USSR at the time of development. Therefore, captured uranium was initially used. However, the reactor required at least 150 tons of this substance. In 1945, mines in East Germany and Czechoslovakia resumed their work. Uranium deposits in the Chita region, Kolyma, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, the North Caucasus and Ukraine were discovered in 1946.

In the Urals, near the city of Kyshtym (not far from Chelyabinsk), they began to build Mayak, a radiochemical plant, and the first industrial reactor in the USSR. Kurchatov personally supervised the laying of uranium. Construction began in 1947 in three more places: two in the Middle Urals and one in the Gorky region.

Construction work proceeded at a rapid pace, but there was still not enough uranium. The first industrial reactor could not be launched even by 1948. It was only on June 7 of this year that uranium was loaded.

Nuclear reactor startup experiment

The “father” of the Soviet atomic bomb personally took over the duties of the chief operator at the control panel of the nuclear reactor. On June 7, between 11 and 12 o'clock at night, Kurchatov began an experiment to launch it. The reactor reached a power of 100 kilowatts on June 8. After this, the “father” of the Soviet atomic bomb silenced the chain reaction that had begun. The next stage of preparing the nuclear reactor lasted for two days. After cooling water was supplied, it became clear that the available uranium was not enough to carry out the experiment. The reactor reached a critical state only after loading the fifth portion of the substance. The chain reaction became possible again. This happened at 8 o'clock in the morning on June 10.

On the 17th of the same month, Kurchatov, the creator of the atomic bomb in the USSR, made an entry in the shift supervisors' journal in which he warned that the water supply should under no circumstances be stopped, otherwise an explosion would occur. On June 19, 1938 at 12:45, the commercial launch of a nuclear reactor, the first in Eurasia, took place.

Successful bomb tests

In June 1949, the USSR accumulated 10 kg of plutonium - the amount that was put into the bomb by the Americans. Kurchatov, the creator of the atomic bomb in the USSR, following Beria's decree, ordered the RDS-1 test to be scheduled for August 29.

A section of the Irtysh arid steppe, located in Kazakhstan, not far from Semipalatinsk, was set aside for a test site. In the center of this experimental field, whose diameter was about 20 km, a metal tower 37.5 meters high was constructed. RDS-1 was installed on it.

The charge used in the bomb was a multi-layer design. In it, the transfer of the active substance to a critical state was carried out by compressing it using a spherical converging detonation wave, which was formed in the explosive.

Consequences of the explosion

The tower was completely destroyed after the explosion. A funnel appeared in its place. However, the main damage was caused by the shock wave. According to the description of eyewitnesses, when a trip to the explosion site took place on August 30, the experimental field presented a terrible picture. The highway and railway bridges were thrown to a distance of 20-30 m and twisted. Cars and carriages were scattered at a distance of 50-80 m from the place where they were located; residential buildings were completely destroyed. The tanks used to test the force of the impact lay with their turrets knocked down on their sides, and the guns became a pile of twisted metal. Also, 10 Pobeda vehicles, specially brought here for testing, burned down.

A total of 5 RDS-1 bombs were manufactured. They were not transferred to the Air Force, but were stored in Arzamas-16. Today in Sarov, which was formerly Arzamas-16 (the laboratory is shown in the photo below), a mock-up of the bomb is on display. It is located in the local nuclear weapons museum.

"Fathers" of the atomic bomb

Only 12 Nobel laureates, future and present, participated in the creation of the American atomic bomb. In addition, they were helped by a group of scientists from Great Britain, which was sent to Los Alamos in 1943.

In Soviet times, it was believed that the USSR had completely independently solved the atomic problem. Everywhere it was said that Kurchatov, the creator of the atomic bomb in the USSR, was its “father.” Although rumors of secrets stolen from Americans occasionally leaked out. And only in 1990, 50 years later, Julius Khariton - one of the main participants in the events of that time - spoke about the large role of intelligence in the creation of the Soviet project. The technical and scientific results of the Americans were obtained by Klaus Fuchs, who arrived in the English group.

Therefore, Oppenheimer can be considered the “father” of bombs that were created on both sides of the ocean. We can say that he was the creator of the first atomic bomb in the USSR. Both projects, American and Russian, were based on his ideas. It is wrong to consider Kurchatov and Oppenheimer only as outstanding organizers. We have already talked about the Soviet scientist, as well as about the contribution made by the creator of the first atomic bomb in the USSR. Oppenheimer's main achievements were scientific. It was thanks to them that he turned out to be the head of the atomic project, just like the creator of the atomic bomb in the USSR.

Brief biography of Robert Oppenheimer

This scientist was born in 1904, April 22, in New York. graduated from Harvard University in 1925. The future creator of the first atomic bomb interned for a year at the Cavendish Laboratory with Rutherford. A year later, the scientist moved to the University of Göttingen. Here, under the guidance of M. Born, he defended his doctoral dissertation. In 1928 the scientist returned to the USA. From 1929 to 1947, the “father” of the American atomic bomb taught at two universities in this country - the California Institute of Technology and the University of California.

On July 16, 1945, the first bomb was successfully tested in the United States, and soon after, Oppenheimer, along with other members of the Provisional Committee created under President Truman, was forced to select targets for future atomic bombing. Many of his colleagues by that time actively opposed the use of dangerous nuclear weapons, which were not necessary, since Japan's surrender was a foregone conclusion. Oppenheimer did not join them.

Explaining his behavior further, he said that he relied on politicians and military men who were better familiar with the real situation. In October 1945, Oppenheimer ceased to be director of the Los Alamos Laboratory. He began work in Priston, heading a local research institute. His fame in the United States, as well as outside this country, reached its culmination. New York newspapers wrote about him more and more often. President Truman presented Oppenheimer with the Medal of Merit, the highest award in America.

In addition to scientific works, he wrote several “Open Mind”, “Science and Everyday Knowledge” and others.

This scientist died in 1967, on February 18. Oppenheimer was a heavy smoker from his youth. In 1965, he was diagnosed with laryngeal cancer. At the end of 1966, after an operation that did not bring results, he underwent chemotherapy and radiotherapy. However, the treatment had no effect, and the scientist died on February 18.

So, Kurchatov is the “father” of the atomic bomb in the USSR, Oppenheimer is in the USA. Now you know the names of those who were the first to work on the development of nuclear weapons. Having answered the question: “Who is called the father of the atomic bomb?”, we told only about the initial stages of the history of this dangerous weapon. It continues to this day. Moreover, today new developments are actively underway in this area. The “father” of the atomic bomb, the American Robert Oppenheimer, as well as the Russian scientist Igor Kurchatov, were only pioneers in this matter.

The creators of atomic weapons I.V. Kurchatov and A.D. Sakharov on a walk.

One of the recently declassified documents of the USSR Atomic Project with the visa of J.V. Stalin.

Academician Ya. B. Zeldovich. 1987 (Photo by S. Novikov.)

Academician Yu. B. Khariton, scientific director of the Arzamas-16 Federal Nuclear Center, next to a model of the first atomic bomb. Sarov, 1992. (Photo by V. Gubarev.)

Academician B.V. Litvinov at the smallest nuclear charge in the Museum of Atomic Weapons in Sarov.

At the Atomic Weapons Museum in Sarov.

A group of physicists at the Plutonium Institute (NII-9): second from left is Academician A.P. Aleksandrov, third from left is Academician A.A. Bochvar.

Director of Scientific Research Institute-9 Academician A. A. Bochvar in his office.

Production of uranium pellets at a plant in Elektrostal.

Monument to the head of the "USSR Atomic Project" I.V. Kurchatov in Snezhinsk ("Chelyabinsk-70").

The first steps in creating the most advanced weapons capable of shooting down nuclear warheads, neutralizing missiles and disabling space guidance and tracking systems can perhaps be traced back to January 1944. Such a statement at first glance looks ridiculous, but nevertheless one declassified document of the “USSR Atomic Project” makes us believe in it and look at our past differently.

So, January 1944. While there is no atomic bomb, even in the Los Alamos laboratories no one can say exactly when it will appear. Well, our prospects are even more vague. And although the fundamental diagrams of the “work” of nuclear charges are already known, both overseas and here we have to overcome a huge number of barriers before the atomic bomb becomes a reality. At this very time, Academician A.I. Alikhanov published a work on how to “defuse uranium bombs.”

Abram Isaakovich Alikhanov is one of the leaders of the USSR Atomic Project. Under his leadership, the first heavy water reactors were created. It can be said that Alikhanov even competed with Kurchatov and was sometimes ahead of him in this rivalry. This happened in 1943 during the elections to full members of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Alikhanov gained more votes and “beat” Kurchatov. Igor Vasilyevich became an academician a couple of days later - he was elected to fill an additional vacancy.

A. I. Alikhanov headed Laboratory No. 3 of the USSR Academy of Sciences, which, from December 1, 1945, operated in parallel with Laboratory No. 2, headed by I. V. Kurchatov. It is likely that Alikhanov's research on "uranium bomb defusing" in 1943 played an important role in his scientific career. On January 4, 1944, Abram Isaakovich presented I.V. Kurchatov with a “Note” based on the results of this work. He showed it to his colleagues. Obviously, the “bomb makers” led by Yu. B. Khariton also became acquainted with the “Note”. After their approval, the document was sent to L.P. Beria. In the Note, Academician Alikhanov first describes how an atomic bomb works:

“The explosion occurs after the two halves of the bomb approach each other, when the total mass of uranium is above the critical mass required for the development of a chain reaction. After this approach, the impact of one neutron causes an explosion... If, however, the bomb, in the process of approaching its halves, is irradiated with a strong flux of neutrons, then a chain reaction begins to develop when the mass exceeds the critical mass insignificantly..., that is, even when one half is at some distance from the other. In this case, the explosion energy will be 10,000 times less, but quite sufficient to rupture the shell of the bomb and so way to destroy it."

Further, Alikhanov gives three options for “neutralizing the atomic bomb” - “killers”, if we use the terminology of the day. Every proposal of a scientist sounds fantastic, but from the point of view of physics it is absolutely real. The first of them is:

“The best way to irradiate a bomb with neutrons would be to introduce into the body of the bomb during its fall a small ampoule of a mixture of radioactive substance with beryllium... The volume of the ampoule will be no more than an ordinary armor-piercing bullet. The most difficult point in this method is the question of hitting the bomb on the fly. However, It seems likely that the development of radar at centimeter and millimeter waves and automatic fire control will make it possible to get closer to solving this problem..."

Very little time will pass, and institutes and scientific centers will appear in the country, which, in particular, will solve the problems put forward by the “fantasies” of Academician Alikhanov.

"The second possible method of irradiating a bomb with neutrons may be based on the fact that the uranium - heavy water boiler is such a powerful source of neutrons that even at a distance of a kilometer the number of neutrons is sufficient to neutralize the bomb. The uranium - heavy water boiler, apparently , will turn out to be a not very cumbersome system, and it can be delivered at high speed (by plane) to the place where the bomb is expected to fall with an accuracy of 100-1000 meters..."

In the same “Note,” Academician Alikhanov predicts the appearance of a “neutron bomb,” which will only be talked about in the mid-1970s, when the scientist will no longer be alive:

“An even more powerful source, but already pulsed, could be... a bomb operating on continuous neutron irradiation. It can be made to operate periodically, like an internal combustion engine, and at the right moment the mode can be boosted instantly.”

In fact, the scientist proposed using a neutron cannon to protect against the impact of an atomic bomb - a new option for destroying all life on Earth! But then he didn’t understand it...

And finally, Alikhanov calls cosmic rays one of the “shields” against the atomic bomb. On this occasion, in the “Note” we read:

"...the third method of irradiation with neutrons is the creation of neutrons in the bomb itself by artificial cosmic rays. The bomb cannot be protected from these rays, with sufficient energy..."

The “note” of A. I. Alikhanov came to the department of L. P. Beria in March 1944. I.V. Kurchatov accompanied it with a request to entrust the relevant institutes with the development of all three methods of protection against a uranium bomb. The further fate of this document is unknown...

Is it possible to buy a cyclotron in America?

On January 31, 1944, the President of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Academician A. A. Bogomolets, sent a letter to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR N. S. Khrushchev, which, in particular, said:

“Taking into account the danger of our backwardness and the need for rapid development of nuclear physics in the Ukrainian SSR, I ask you to contact Comrade A. I. Mikoyan with a request to order an integrated cyclotron laboratory in the USA, where there is the greatest experience in the construction and operation of cyclotrons. This will make it possible to reduce our a lag of several years and use the rich experience of the USA... Since no one in the USSR has experience in operating a large cyclotron installation, it is absolutely necessary to send several qualified physicists to the USA to gain operating experience, participate in the design of the cyclotron and implement orders..."

The total cost of the cyclotron was about 500 thousand dollars. It was intended for the laboratory of Academician A.I. Leypunsky, whom the President of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences also recommended to send to the USA.

N. S. Khrushchev found the scientists’ arguments convincing, and he turned to A. I. Mikoyan:

“If there is any opportunity to purchase a cyclotron in America, I kindly ask you to satisfy the request of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.”

To Nikita Sergeevich’s credit, it should be noted: in all his posts he tried to support science and scientists. And thanks to this, we have achieved outstanding success in rocket science, space exploration and the creation of nuclear weapons. But in fairness, it is worth recalling that N.S. Khrushchev also stood behind T.D. Lysenko and thereby caused enormous damage to our biology, genetics and science in general.

Letters from A. A. Bogomolets and N. S. Khrushchev immediately fell into Beria’s department. They decided that they contained two gross errors. Scientists of Ukraine (read - USSR), firstly, reveal the low level of physical research in the country, and secondly, they show the interest of our scientists in work related to new weapons, since only cyclotrons can accumulate new substances.

So the letters of Bogomolets and Khrushchev ended up in a secret archive. However, the story with the “Ukrainian cyclotron” did not end there. Other prominent scientists, not only in Ukraine, but also at the “big” academy in Moscow, also thought about him. Academician A.I. Leypunsky took up the matter. On August 8, 1945, he writes to J.V. Stalin:

The “atomic” bomb is not an isolated invention, but the beginning of a major revolution in military technology and the national economy. Nuclear physics is at the beginning of its development; there are still many problems in it, the solution of which will determine the development of new directions... Therefore, it is especially important to take all possible measures to accelerate the development of nuclear physics and nuclear technology in the USSR and to educate numerous specialists in this field..."

A.I. Leypunsky believes that there should be several research centers similar to Laboratory No. 2, one of them is in Kyiv, where a site for the construction of a cyclotron has already been prepared and a corresponding project has been made. The scientist expects success, since just two days earlier the Americans exploded an atomic bomb over Hiroshima.

Stalin sent an appeal from A.I. Leipunsky to L.P. Beria. He instructed to consider it at the Technical Council of the First Main Directorate (PGU). Everyone who took part in the meeting, of course, supported their colleague from Kyiv, but no funds were found for the construction of the cyclotron, and purchasing it abroad was out of the question... Neither the leadership of the Academy of Sciences nor Leipunsky knew anything about the results of the secret meeting . A year later, without waiting for an answer, he again turned to PSU with a request for help in building a cyclotron. This time there was a positive response, and Academician A.I. Leipunsky began to work - first in Moscow, and then in Obninsk.

All the secrets of "Enormosis"

The scouts “traveled through the atomic empire,” which was created by physicists in Europe and America starting in October 1941. They extracted unique information for Soviet scientists, and month after month it became more and more. The maximum amount of intelligence materials arrived in the USSR in 1944 - this, of course, was the greatest achievement of our intelligence.

“Enormoz” is a code name assigned back in 1941 by the USSR NKVD to work on an atomic bomb carried out by intelligence agencies. Many documents on Enormoz have not yet been declassified, and there is no hope that this will happen in the coming years. But what became known cannot but amaze... From declassified materials, for example, it follows that on November 5, 1944, our scientists were informed in detail about the state of scientific work on the problem of "Enormosis" in the USA, England, Canada, France, Germany:

“The USA is the most important center of work on Enormoz, both in scale and in the results achieved. The work continues to develop very successfully. The results of research carried out at the country's leading universities are quickly put into practice: simultaneously with the work in the laboratories, design work is being carried out, semi-production plants are being built and factory construction is being carried out on a large scale... According to available data, the 1st experimental bomb should be ready in the fall of 1944..."

“The bulk of the British work on Enormoz is being carried out in Canada, where they were transferred for reasons of greater safety from enemy air raids and in order to get closer to the Americans...”

“The work is being carried out in Montreal, in the system of the Canadian National Research Council. The scientific team, consisting of workers transferred from England and local workers, has increased significantly and amounts to 250 people. The main objects of work are the construction of two nuclear plants of the uranium-graphite system...”

“The famous French physicist Joliot-Curie, engaged in research in the field of Enormosis, allegedly achieved significant results. Although the British, and possibly also the Americans, have already made some attempts to get closer to Joliot, the latter, apparently, will remain in France and is unlikely to cooperate with anyone without the official consent of his government. Thus, another center of work on "Enormoz..." arises.

“We do not have exact data on the state of development of the Enormoz problem in this country (we are talking about Germany. - Ed.). The available information is contradictory. According to some of them, the Germans have achieved significant results, according to others - Germany with its economic and under martial law he cannot conduct any serious scientific work in the field of Enormosis.

Thus, thanks to intelligence, the Soviet government and scientists led by I.V. Kurchatov had a pretty good idea of ​​the achievements in the creation of nuclear weapons around the world. The reliability of the information was confirmed by various sources - at that time physicists collaborated with intelligence, they pinned hopes on our country for victory over fascism.

Documents of the First Main Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR indicate:

“During the period of agent development, i.e. from the end of 1941 to the present, quite significant results have been achieved. During this time, an agency has been created that systematically supplied us with valuable information, which made it possible to monitor the development of scientific work in countries, as well as valuable technical materials essentially the problem..."

Time will pass, and the work of Soviet intelligence on the “USSR Atomic Project” will go down in the history of the twentieth century as one of the most effective.

"Trust Khariton and Sobolev!"

This is exactly how one can formulate the request that Kurchatov made to the leadership of the NKGB of the USSR on April 30, 1945.

Igor Vasilyevich himself became acquainted with the materials coming from intelligence officers (sometimes I.K. Kikoin got involved), and then “distributed” them to one or another employee of Laboratory No. 2. Naturally, they did not know how and where Kurchatov received information about nuclear boilers , about the design of an atomic bomb, about methods for separating uranium isotopes, about plutonium. More and more information was coming from intelligence officers, and Kurchatov could no longer cope with the translations of materials on his own. In addition, he was afraid of missing important details about the design of the bomb or its calculations.

Kurchatov’s “Notes” to the head of the First Main Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR G. B. Ovakimyan contains a request to allow Yu. B. Khariton and S. L. Sobolev to translate intelligence materials. In one of them, he writes, in particular:

"... I ask for your permission to allow me to work on... the translation of Prof. Yu. B. Khariton (from the 2nd half of p. 2 to the end, with the exception of p. 22). Prof. Yu. B. Khariton is engaged in the design of uranium bomb and is one of the largest scientists in our country on explosive phenomena. Until now, he was not familiar with the materials even in the Russian text, and only I orally informed him about the probabilities of spontaneous fission of uranium-235 and uranium-238 and about the general principles " implosion "method". (Igor Vasilyevich emphasized the words that Khariton had never read materials obtained by intelligence. - Author's note.)

In another “Note,” Kurchatov writes to G. B. Ovakimyan: “I ask for your permission to allow Academician Sergei Lvovich Sobolev to work on translating materials on mathematical issues of the separation plant. Until now, Academician S. L. Sobolev has become acquainted with the Russian text of materials on these issues ", and their translation was carried out either by your employees or by Prof. I. K. Kikoin. My request for permission to translate Academician S. L. Sobolev is caused by the large volume of materials and the heavy workload of Prof. I. K. Kikoin."

The archives of the “Atomic Project of the USSR” did not preserve anything about how the leaders of the NKGB of the USSR responded to Kurchatov’s request, and Yu. B. Khariton and S. L. Sobolev themselves never talked about this episode of their lives. Most likely, they were never allowed to access the intelligence documents, and they received only Russian texts. The NKGB feared that the originals might reveal the sources of information, and the fewer people knew about their existence, the more reliable the intelligence work was. This principle was strictly observed, so even today, half a century later, many pages of the “Atomic Project of the USSR” are still covered with a veil of secrecy.

Branch in Leningrad

Most of the physicists on whose shoulders the implementation of the USSR Atomic Project fell came from the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology. Naturally, Kurchatov considered it necessary to create a branch of Laboratory No. 2 there. There was a powerful industry in the city, and there were enough physicists... At least, this was the case before the war and the blockade. I.K. Kikoin, A.I. Alikhanov, S.L. Sobolev and I.N. Voznesensky went to Leningrad.

Later, Academician I.K. Kikoin spoke about this trip as follows:

“We... went to Leningrad in order to find out which of the scientists who survived the blockade could be involved in work in the branch of Laboratory No. 2. I. N. Voznesensky was lucky - he managed to find about 10 specialists for his work (through the NKVD) "The situation with physicists was worse - there were only a few of them, since a significant part of them, mainly employees of the Physico-Technical Institute, were in evacuation, the rest died in Leningrad. At the same time, we probed the condition of the leading enterprises of the city and the possibility of involving them in our work..."

Despite all the difficulties, a branch of Laboratory No. 2 was created (GKO Decree No. 5407ss of March 15, 1944). I.K. Kikoin was appointed its leader. At the branch, he also formed a Special Design Bureau (OKB) headed by I. N. Voznesensky. The team was recruited mainly from employees of the Physico-Technical Institute who returned from Sverdlovsk, where they worked during the war. Within a month, the branch of Laboratory No. 2 and the OKB began to operate. They had to create methods for separating uranium isotopes and design experimental equipment for the industrial production of nuclear explosives.

Academician A.I. Alikhanov was also eager to go to Leningrad. He considered it his hometown and, naturally, thought that he should be the one to head the new laboratory. However, there were other reasons for this...

On March 3, 1944, Alikhanov sent a letter to one of the leaders of the USSR Atomic Project, M. G. Pervukhin, in which he very “transparently” hinted at his difficult relationship with I. V. Kurchatov. Abram Isaakovich never mentioned his last name, but between the lines one could see resentment and a reluctance to remain “in the shadow” of Kurchatov. Alikhanov himself believed that in terms of work experience and authority among physicists he was not inferior to Igor Vasilyevich.

It seems to me that Alikhanov’s letter reveals the essence of the relationship between the two scientists. It is generally accepted that Kurchatov’s authority was unquestionable, and his opinion was almost a law for colleagues and officials. But that's not true. There was a struggle within the Atomic Project. Sometimes it became obvious, for example in the rivalry between Kurchatov and Alikhanov.

In his letter to Pervukhin, Alikhanov did not hide the conflict nature of the situation. He wrote:

“You rejected my project of moving my laboratory to Leningrad, based on the considerations that work on nuclear issues is concentrated in Moscow, and my colleagues and I are specialists in this field of physics. At first I also understood my role in Laboratory No. 2, however very soon I was forced to make sure that all materials containing any information on issues of my specialty - the atomic nucleus - were hidden from me. Moreover, there were cases of prohibition for individual employees to talk and discuss with me some specific issues in this areas..."

Abram Isaakovich did not know when he wrote this letter that all the prohibitions and restrictions did not come from Kurchatov, not from Pervukhin, and not even from Beria. This was the will of Stalin himself, for whom intelligence materials coming from America meant much more than the work of Soviet physicists. Information about work on the atomic bomb at that time had more political significance than technical significance. Hence many of the restrictions that the special services introduced.

But Academician Alikhanov judged the situation in his own way:

“... inside Laboratory No. 2 I did not have and do not have any rights, even minor ones, which is very well known to the maintenance and technical apparatus of the laboratory. On certain organizational or scientific issues I was involved not due to the established procedure, but depending on the desire of the management laboratory. For these reasons, it seems to me that the only solution is to move to Leningrad, especially in connection with the creation of a branch there..."

M. G. Pervukhin invited Alikhanov to his place. They talked long and thoroughly. Abram Isaakovich learned that the fate of the branch in Leningrad had already been decided - I.K. Kikoin had been appointed its head. Alikhanov took this news as another slap in the face. The conflict was resolved only in December 1945, when he was appointed director of Laboratory No. 3. However, Alikhanov was no longer destined to emerge “from the shadow” of Kurchatov...

Source not declassified

The flow of secret information from America increased as work on the Manhattan Project expanded. The Americans failed to prevent the leak of classified information, and this became increasingly obvious to our intelligence agencies...

In March 1944, the GRU of the General Staff of the Red Army received a thick stack of new documents - a detailed report on the creation of nuclear weapons. It is curious that to this day the true name of the source of this information is unknown. Even in the GRU archives his trace is lost.

The source, one of the scientists involved in the Manhattan Project, gave “Achilles” (this was the pseudonym of GRU employee A.A. Adams) not only about a thousand pages of documentation on the bomb, but also samples of pure uranium and beryllium. This “package” safely reached Moscow through diplomatic channels.

Achilles' cover letter allows us to better imagine the atmosphere in which our intelligence officers had to work. In particular, he writes:

"Dear Director!

...This time the nature of the material being sent is so important that it will require special attention and urgent action from both my side and yours, especially yours...

I don’t know to what extent you are aware that they are working hard here on the problem of using the energy of uranium (I’m not sure if this is what this element is called in Russian) for military purposes. I personally do not know molecular physics enough to explain to you in detail what the task of this work is, but I can report that this work is already here at the stage of technology for the production of a new element - plutonium, which should play a huge role in a real war...

A secret fund of one billion dollars, at the personal disposal of the President, has been allocated and has already been almost spent on research work and work on the development of production technology for the previously mentioned elements. Six world-famous scientists: Fermi, Allison, Compton, Urey, Oppenheimer and others (most of them received the Nobel Prize) are at the head of this project. Thousands of engineers and technicians of various nationalities are involved in this work...

Three main methods for producing plutonium were used in the initial stage of research: the diffusion method, the mass spectrometric method, and the atomic transmutation method. Apparently, the latter method gave more positive results. This is important for our scientists to know if anyone is working in this area...

I have a connection with a highly qualified source who would be more helpful if he could meet with our highly qualified chemists and physicists... This is just the beginning. I will receive materials from him several times. The first edition contains about 1000 pages. The material is top secret. Despite the fact that I hung around universities for about two years, until recently I was unable to find out anything concrete. They have learned to keep secrets here... The staff is carefully checked. There are a lot of rumors around these enterprises. Persons working at peripheral enterprises go there for a year without the right to leave the territory of the enterprises, which are guarded by military units...

My source told me that a projectile is already being designed, which, when dropped on the ground, will destroy with radiation everything living in an area of ​​hundreds of miles. He would not want such a shell to be dropped on the soil of our country. The complete destruction of Japan is projected, but there is no guarantee that our allies will not try to influence us when they have such weapons at their disposal...

It's hard for me to write. My vision is very limited, but my letters are not important, but the material is important: I hope it will be given the necessary attention and a quick reaction will follow, which will guide me in future work...

I am sending samples of uranium and beryllium..."

As you know, another source of information, physicist Klaus Fuchs, also obtained for us a lot of absolutely invaluable materials. They became a kind of “guiding thread” that led Kurchatov’s team through the labyrinths of nuclear physics in the shortest possible way, thanks to which they managed to avoid many mistakes in the development and creation of the atomic bomb.

But we will remember not only Klaus Fuchs, who, by the way, lived to a ripe old age. History hides many more names. We may never know about everyone who sought to help our country in implementing the Atomic Project. It was gratitude for our victory, for saving humanity from fascism - the USSR was helped by scientists working in the USA, Canada and England. Their names, most likely, will never be revealed - and it’s not for us to judge whether this is right or wrong... Let’s just remember that such people lived and fought for our future.

“Achilles” wrote his report in July 1944, but he already knew that atomic bombs would be used against Japan. Foresight or knowledge of facts? Were the Americans already planning atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the summer of 1944?

It seems to me that the Achilles Report encourages us to take a fresh look at the history of the development of the Manhattan Project - it is possible that many of its pages should be written differently than it appears to the public today.

Who was the prisoner?

Already in the spring of 1945, special detachments were sent to Germany from the USSR, searching for physicists and other specialists who could work for the USSR Atomic Project. A little later, at the beginning of 1946, I.V. Kurchatov made the following confession:

“Until May 1945, there was no hope of creating a uranium-graphite boiler, since we had only 7 tons of uranium oxide at our disposal, and the required 100 tons of uranium could not be produced earlier than 1948. In the middle of last year, Comrade Beria sent a special a group of workers from Laboratory No. 2 and the NKVD, led by Comrades Zavenyagin, Makhnev and Kikoin to search for uranium and uranium raw materials. As a result of a lot of work, the group found and exported to the USSR 300 tons of uranium oxide and its compounds, which seriously changed the situation not only with uranium -a graphite boiler, but also with all other uranium structures..."

It seems to me that with this recognition, Igor Vasilyevich puts a worthy end to the dispute that historians have been waging for many decades. Some insisted on the decisive participation of German specialists in our Atomic Project and the use of materials obtained in Germany, others tried to downplay, and sometimes completely obscure, their role in the creation of Soviet atomic weapons. The truth, as most often happens, is somewhere in the middle. Kurchatov testifies to exactly this. But Igor Vasilyevich did not tell the whole truth. He could not do this, because at that time all documents were still marked “Top Secret”. It took half a century for it to finally be removed...

Documents show that the main events around uranium begin to unfold in Germany in April 1945. At this time, L.P. Beria receives two letters - one from V.A. Makhnev, who is directly responsible for the Atomic Project, and the other from V.N. Merkulov, who monitors all information coming from intelligence officers.

The first letter states, in part:

“In Upper Silesia, 45 kilometers south of the city of Liegnitz, where hostilities are currently taking place, there is the Schmiedeberg uranium deposit... It is advisable to send several geologists and ore processing specialists to the 2nd Ukrainian Front to determine on-site the characteristics of the said deposit and introduce proposals for their use. At the same time, specialists should be sent to the 3rd Ukrainian Front to familiarize themselves with the Radium Institute in Vienna, which, apparently, was used by the Germans for work on uranium.

I request your permission to urgently send the following specialists to these areas:

to the 3rd Ukrainian Front - physicist G. N. Flerova, physicist I. N. Golovina (from Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences);

to the 2nd Ukrainian Front - geologist prof. Rusakova M.P., geologist Malinovsky F.M. (from the Committee for Geological Affairs under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR).

Both groups of these specialists must be headed by NKVD workers..."

The last postscript is typical for that time: scientists were controlled even in cases where their reliability was not in doubt. Well, they themselves said that the presence of NKVD workers was explained by ensuring their safety. However, such a statement is not without foundation: the allies closely monitored the work of groups of Soviet specialists, of course, in those cases when they became aware of them.

Our intelligence officers also did not take their eyes off their “wards”. This is evidenced, in particular, by Merkulov’s letter:

“According to intelligence information received from a source that does not raise any doubts about the sincerity, the NKGB resident in London reported that the Germans exported the uranium reserves available in France and Belgium in 1942 to Silesia and other eastern regions of Germany...”

It was not yet known then that in total more than 3,500 tons of uranium salts were exported from Belgium to Germany, from which almost 15 tons of uranium metal were obtained by the end of the war. Some of this uranium was found and transported to the USSR...

In the days when the Soviet people rejoiced, celebrating Victory Day, Kurchatov sent a number of letters to Beria. Igor Vasilyevich is in a hurry, he understands that delay could be disastrous for the project: the work will drag on for months, and possibly years, if now, these days, the most energetic measures are not taken to search for uranium.

“The latest information we received about work abroad shows that currently 6 uranium-graphite boilers are already operating in America, each of which contains about 30 tons of uranium metal. Two of these boilers are used for scientific research, and four, the most powerful , - to obtain plutonium.

The information indicates that the impetus for the enormous work on uranium that is now being carried out in America was given by reports received from Germany about successes in the field of uranium-heavy water boilers. In this regard, I consider it absolutely necessary for an urgent trip to Berlin by a group of scientists from Laboratory No. 2 of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, headed by Comrade V. A. Makhnev, to clarify on the spot the results of scientific work, the removal of uranium, heavy water and other materials, and also for interviewing German scientists working on uranium..."

On the same day, Beria receives interesting information from the active army. It reports that the Institute for Theoretical Physics, where work on uranium and radium was carried out, was discovered in Berlin. 50 kilograms of uranium metal and about two tons of uranium oxide were found there. It was decided to urgently send G.N. Flerov and L.A. Artsimovich to Berlin so that they could inspect the institute’s laboratories and talk with scientists.

Three days later - May 8 - Kurchatov presents Beria with a list of German scientists who may be involved in work on uranium in Germany. It has 35 people. Igor Vasilievich knew their names from those publications in scientific journals that were available to him. Unfortunately, it turns out that most of the physicists on this list work in America.

Events, I repeat, developed rapidly. Already on May 10, V. A. Makhnev transmits a note by HF to L. P. Beria, in which he informs about the first results of the work of his group in Germany. In addition to a detailed list of equipment and materials discovered in scientific institutions in Berlin and other cities, the note contains information that later played a special role in the “USSR Atomic Project”:

"...3. In the same area there is a completely preserved private institute of the world-famous scientist Baron von Ardenne, whose laboratory is leading in the field of electron microscopy throughout the world... Von Ardenne gave me a statement addressed to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR that he wants to work only "

This is how Laboratory “A” appeared in the Soviet Union. She was in Sukhumi, in the building of the Sinop sanatorium. The laboratory, headed by Manfred von Ardenne, was part of the Ninth Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR.

In the “Atomic Project of the USSR”, Ardenne’s group took a worthy place: it developed new methods for separating uranium isotopes. One of them still bears the name of its creator...

On June 18, 1945, the first results of the work of a group of Soviet scientists in Germany were summed up. The following information was sent to L.P. Beria:

“We report that in accordance with the Resolution of the State Defense Committee and your order, the following enterprises and institutions were dismantled in Germany and shipped to the Soviet Union... (this list has not been declassified to this day. - Author's note). ...Total shipped and sent to the USSR 7 trains - 380 cars... Together with the equipment of physical institutes and chemical and metallurgical enterprises, 39 German scientists, engineers, craftsmen and, in addition to them, 61 people - members of their families, and a total of 99 Germans were sent to the USSR... In different places, goods taken from Berlin and hidden about 250-300 tons of uranium compounds and about 7 tons of uranium metal. They were completely shipped to the Soviet Union..."

It was assumed that part of the equipment for the "USSR Atomic Project" would come from those areas of Germany that were occupied by the Allies, but would later move into the Soviet zone. However, nothing came of it. US intelligence services were well informed about the removal of scientists, materials and equipment to the USSR. They did everything possible to leave in Germany “a scientific desert without physicists and physics.” And they succeeded.

German scientists worked fruitfully in the USSR Atomic Project. After the creation of the atomic bomb, many of them were awarded Soviet state awards and considerable cash prizes. After Stalin’s death, almost all of them went back to Germany, now to the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Academician Zh. I. Alferov recalls:

Paradoxical thinking has always been inherent in Alexandrov. Is it really possible to become a great scientist without this?!

Vladimir GUBAREV

The beginning of work on nuclear fission in the USSR can be considered the 1920s.

In November 1921, the State Physico-Technical Radiological Institute (later the Leningrad Physico-Technical Institute (LPTI), now the A.F. Ioffe Physico-Technical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences) was founded, which was headed by Academician Abram Ioffe for more than three decades. Since the beginning of the 1930s, nuclear physics has become one of the main areas of Russian physical science.

For the rapid development of nuclear research, Abram Ioffe invited talented young physicists to his institute, among whom was Igor Kurchatov, who headed the nuclear physics department created at LFTI in 1933.

In 1939, physicists Yuli Khariton, Jan Frenkel and Alexander Leypunsky substantiated the possibility of a nuclear fission chain reaction occurring in uranium. Physicists Yakov Zeldovich and Yuliy Khariton calculated the critical mass of a uranium charge, and Kharkov scientists Viktor Maslov and Vladimir Spinel received a certificate for the invention “On the use of uranium as an explosive or toxic substance” in October 1941. During this period, Soviet physicists came close to a theoretical solution to the problem of creating nuclear weapons, but after the outbreak of the war, work on the uranium problem was suspended.

Three departments were involved in resolving the issue of resuming war-interrupted work on the uranium problem in the USSR: the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Red Army General Staff and the apparatus of the authorized State Defense Committee (GKO).

There are two main stages of the USSR atomic project: the first is preparatory (September 1942 - July 1945), the second is decisive (August 1945 - August 1949). The first stage begins with State Defense Order No. 2352 of September 28, 1942 “On the organization of work on uranium.” It provided for the resumption of work on the research and use of atomic energy, interrupted by the war. On March 10, 1943, Stalin signed the decision of the State Defense Committee of the USSR to appoint Igor Kurchatov to the newly created post of scientific director of work on the use of atomic energy in the USSR. In 1943, a scientific research center on the uranium problem was created - Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences, now the Russian Scientific Center "Kurchatov Institute".

At this stage, intelligence data played a decisive role. The result of the first stage was the awareness of the importance and reality of creating an atomic bomb.

The second stage began with the American bombing of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945. In the USSR, emergency measures were taken to speed up work on the nuclear project. On August 20, 1945, Stalin signed GKO Resolution No. 9887 “On the Special Committee under the GKO.” Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, member of the State Defense Committee Lavrentiy Beria was appointed Chairman of the Committee. The Committee, in addition to the key task of organizing the development and production of atomic bombs, was entrusted with organizing all activities on the use of atomic energy in the USSR.

On April 9, 1946, a closed resolution was adopted by the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the creation of a design bureau (KB 11) at Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences to develop the design of an atomic bomb. Pavel Zernov was appointed head of KB 11, and Yuli Khariton was appointed chief designer. The top-secret facility was located 80 km from Arzamas on the territory of the former Sarov Monastery (now the Russian Federal Nuclear Center All-Russian Research Institute of Experimental Physics).

In 1946, the Soviet nuclear project entered the industrial stage, during which enterprises and plants for the production of nuclear fissile material were created, mainly in the Urals.

By January 1949, the entire range of design issues for RDS 1 (this was the conventional name given to the first atomic bomb) had been worked out. In the Irtysh steppe, 170 km from the city of Semipalatinsk, the testing complex Training Site No. 2 of the USSR Ministry of Defense was built. In May 1949, Kurchatov arrived at the training ground; he supervised the tests. On August 21, 1949, the main charge arrived at the test site. At 4 o'clock in the morning on August 29, the atomic bomb was lifted onto a test tower 37.5 m high. At 7 o'clock in the morning the first test of Soviet atomic weapons took place. It was successful.

In 1946, work began in the USSR on thermonuclear (hydrogen) weapons.